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ABSTRACT 
Buffer for universities or agent of government? Examining the roles and functions of the 
Tertiary Education Council in higher education in Botswana 
 
K. G. Lebotse 
M.Ed. Full Thesis, Higher Education Masters in Africa (HEMA), Institute for Post-School 
Studies, University of the Western Cape. 
The purpose of the study is to understand the roles, functions and perceived performance of the 
Tertiary Education Council (TEC) in higher education governance in Botswana. The study 
describes the relationship between the government, the TEC and higher education institutions 
in Botswana. The main objectives of the study are to: 
a) Examine the roles and functions of the TEC in Botswana’s higher education regarding 
policy formulation, quality assurance and coordination in the planning and 
development of tertiary education. 
b) Explore potential tensions between the roles and functions of the TEC and those of 
some of its stakeholders. 
c) Establish the performance of the TEC in relation to the three functions of policy 
formulation, quality assurance and coordination in the planning and development of 
tertiary education. 
The study is located within the broader framework of higher education governance. It examines 
the different models of higher education governance (such as state control, state interference 
and state supervision models) and the relationship involved between different stakeholders in 
governance of higher education. Furthermore, the framework focuses on the implications of 
the dynamics of higher education governance on the roles and functions of buffer bodies. 
The study adopted a single case study approach and it was designed to allow for the use of 
multiple sources of evidence. Data was collected through a review of both institutional and 
policy documents, semi-structured interviews with eight informants from the TEC and the 
Ministry of Education and Skills Development, as well as a survey targeting institutional heads 
of higher education institutions in Botswana. The use of qualitative and quantitative methods 
of data collection provided useful and in-depth data and allowed for triangulation. The data 
was analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
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The findings of the study reveal that there are differing conceptions of the TEC’s role in higher 
education in Botswana. Whereas the TEC sees itself as ‘middleman’ between the government 
and higher education institutions, the higher education institutions conceptualise the role of the 
TEC as an extension of government. The differing views on the TEC’s role, as either buffer or 
agent, result in different expectations of the roles and functions of the TEC. In addition, the 
study revealed that Botswana’s higher education system is characterised by fragmentation and 
duplication of roles, which limit the mandate of the TEC, thereby creating tensions between 
the TEC and other constituencies in the Botswana higher education system.  
The study thus contributes to the understanding of the roles and functions of the TEC in the 
governance of higher education in Botswana. It also contributes to the understanding of the 
relationship between the different stakeholders involved in the governance of higher education 
and the implications of this relationship on the roles and functions of buffer bodies. Overall, 
the study shows the complexities involved in the governance of higher education in a young 
and evolving system of higher education, and in a context in which the roles and functions of 
the key players are contested and inconsistently understood.  
March 2014  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
A number of countries across the world have established “buffer” or “intermediary” bodies 
between government and higher1 education institutions (HEIs) to oversee the development and 
functioning of higher education systems. According to Neave (1992:11), buffer bodies in 
higher education provide a “zone of negotiation between universities as consumers of public 
resources and the government as the provider”. Such bodies include funding councils, quality 
assurance agencies and research councils. Established buffer bodies are found in a number of 
African countries. Examples include the Commission for Higher Education in Kenya, the 
National Commission of Accreditation and Evaluation in Mozambique, the Higher Education 
Accreditation Council in Tanzania, the Council on Higher Education in South Africa, the 
National Accreditation Board in Ghana and the National University Council in Nigeria 
(Altbach & Teferra, 2003).   
Buffer bodies are often referred to as national councils of higher education, national higher 
education commissions or tertiary education councils (TEC) (Saint, Lao & Materu, 2009). 
These bodies are typically established to play an advisory role to the government on higher 
education policy, funding allocations to the institutions, quality assurance and planning for 
higher education development (Saint et al., 2009).  
The recent emergence of buffer bodies in higher education in developing countries should be 
understood within the context of the rapid expansion of private HEIs, funding provisions and 
diversification of programmes and qualifications as well as cross-border provisions in higher 
education (Nhundu, 2008). The increasing demand for higher education in African countries 
has resulted in an increased number of private HEIs. This increased number of private HEIs 
led to a questioning of quality issues and therefore the need for regulation. Faced with these 
challenges, governments have seen it fit to introduce buffer bodies to help deal with the quality 
issues facing the sector. The general thrust of the literature suggests that buffer bodies were 
created in developing countries to “oversee these large and complex systems” (Saint et al., 
2009:viii). 
                                                          
1 The terms “higher education/institution(s)” and “tertiary education/institution(s)” are used interchangeably in 
this study. 
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Like many other developing countries, the higher education sector in Botswana has 
experienced phenomenal growth in terms of student enrolments, new tertiary education 
institutions and diversification of programmes (Ramatsui, Kupe & Molutsi, 2008). This student 
enrolment numbers rose from 20 011 in 2003/4 to 47 889 in 2008/9 (Tertiary Education 
Council, 2009). Likewise, tertiary education providers increased from one public tertiary 
institution in the 1980s to 39 tertiary education providers in 2013, 13 of which are privately 
owned institutions (Tertiary Education Council, 2008a; TEC website, 2013).  
Because of these changes in the sector, the quality of education offered by these mushrooming 
institutions to an increasing student population has become an issue of serious concern to the 
government. The TEC was established by 1999 parliamentary act to oversee and give direction 
to the higher education sector in Botswana.  
Even though it was formally established in 1999, the TEC commenced operations only in 2004. 
Available literature does not offer explanations as to why it took so long for the Council to start 
operating (Tertiary Education Council, 2008a). Guided by the Tertiary Education Act of 1999, 
the TEC has developed regulations for establishing new private tertiary institutions, registration 
of existing public and private tertiary institutions, accreditation of private tertiary institutions 
and norms and standards that guide tertiary education institutions. More so, the TEC, through 
parliamentary procedure, produced the Tertiary Education Policy (TEP) in 2008 termed 
‘Towards a Knowledge Society’ (Government of Botswana, 2008).  
Following recommendations from the Tertiary Education Policy (Government of Botswana, 
2008) and the National Human Resource Development Strategy (NHRDS) (2009), the TEC 
merged with the Manpower Planning Unit (MPU) in the Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning and the Botswana Training Authority (BOTA), a sister organisation of the TEC that 
focuses on education up to and including certificate level. The rationale for the merger was of 
the identified weaknesses of existing oversight bodies (Government of Botswana, 2009). The 
merged institution was to be known as the Human Resource Development Council (HRDC) 
and was expected to be operational by 2012. By the time of concluding this study, the TEC had 
ceased to exist and has been replaced by the HRDC.  
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The governance of higher education in Botswana has been undergoing changes over the years. 
In the midst of these changes, roles for the governance of tertiary education have been changing 
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as well. For instance, before the establishment of the TEC, the University of Botswana (UB) 
was responsible for assuring quality in tertiary educational institutions in the country through 
affiliations by institutions to the university. The Government of Botswana through the Ministry 
of Education and Skills Development (MoESD) was responsible for, among other things, 
funding the tertiary education sector, hiring of staff for public institutions, and regulating 
tertiary education in the country. Through the Tertiary Education Act of 1999, the Government 
of Botswana established the TEC. The council has been tasked with, among other duties, the 
responsibility of formulating tertiary education policy, coordinating long term planning of 
tertiary education and ensuring the quality of tertiary education. 
Consequently, the establishment of the TEC meant that some of the responsibilities carried out 
by other stakeholders in higher education governance were to be taken over by the new 
organisation. Since its establishment in 1999, the TEC has been faced with serious operational 
problems emanating from a variety of factors (Molatlhegi and associates, 2010). These factors 
include the weaknesses identified with the current set up of oversight bodies, such as the 
overlapping mandates between the TEC, MPU and BOTA. These structures are said to be 
fragmented and suffering from a lack of both vertical and horizontal integration (Government 
of Botswana, 2009), due to their location in different ministries, which made coordination 
difficult (Government of Botswana, 2009). Thus, the TEC fell under the Ministry of Education 
and Skills Development, whereas BOTA was under the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs 
and MPU in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. 
The TEC scenario presents an interesting dimension as the actual introduction of buffer bodies 
has not been researched much. The fact that buffer bodies are a relatively new phenomenon in 
the African higher education landscape implies that they are bound to face operational 
challenges in their endeavour to fulfil their mandate of standing as ‘middlemen’ between the 
government and HEIs. According to El-Khawas (1992), the role of operating as an intermediary 
is a precarious one. El-Khawas argues that most buffer bodies cannot sustain themselves as 
neutral parties between the government and HEIs and end up tilting towards one of the parties 
and in the process failing to fulfil their mandate. This leads to tension between the functions of 
buffer bodies and its stakeholders. Despite El-Khawas’ claim about the precarious role played 
by buffer bodies, very little has been done in Africa to probe these claims. The TEC scenario 
provides many opportunities to probe the claims made by El-Khawas in an African higher 
education system. Therefore, this study sets out to examine the role played by the TEC in the 
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governance of higher education in Botswana and explore the dynamics involved in the way the 
TEC operates and then how these dynamics affect TEC’s delivery on its mandate.  
1.3 Aim and objectives of the study   
The overall aim of the study is to examine the roles, functions and perceived performance of 
the TEC in higher education governance in Botswana. 
The study is guided by the following objectives: 
a) To examine the roles and functions of the TEC in Botswana’s higher education with 
regard to policy formulation, quality assurance and coordination in the planning and 
development of tertiary education. 
b) To explore the potential tensions between the roles and functions of the TEC and those 
of some of its key stakeholders (government and HEIs). 
c) To establish the perceived performance of the TEC in relation to three functions of 
policy formulation, quality assurance and coordination in the planning and 
development of tertiary education. 
1.4 Research questions 
Pursuant of the above aim and objectives of the study, the following research questions are 
posed: 
a) How do the different stakeholders conceive of the role of the TEC in higher education? 
b) What are the potential tensions that exist between the government, the TEC and higher 
education institutions in terms of the roles and functions of the TEC? 
c) What is the perceived effect of the tensions on the performance of the TEC in relation 
to the three selected functions?  
1.5 Scope of the study 
The primary aim of the study is to examine the roles and functions of the TEC in higher 
education governance in Botswana with reference to the stated functions. The higher education 
system in Botswana has a wide range of role players. These role players include the 
Government of Botswana through the Ministry of Education and Skills Development; the TEC; 
the HEIs; the students; the academic community; the private sector; and the wider community 
(Tertiary Education Council, 2012). For purposes of this study, the scope of role players is 
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limited to the TEC, the government and the HEIs, due to the existing gap in the literature around 
the tensions between the roles and functions of buffer bodies, government and HEIs. 
  
Moreover, while the scope and focus of such an investigation could include all the functions 
of the TEC, this study specifically limits itself to three selected TEC functions relating to the 
formulation of tertiary education policy and advisory role to the government, coordination in 
the planning and development of tertiary education and quality assurance in tertiary education 
institutions.  
1.6 Rationale and significance of the study 
This study is considered important as it comes at a time when the TEC is expected to be 
dissolved to pave the way for the formation of the proposed HRDC. This study therefore 
contributes to the understanding of the higher education governance in Botswana through the 
examination of the roles, functions and performance of the TEC and role conceptions of 
different stakeholders. This will help in the clarification of roles for different stakeholders 
involved in the governance of higher education in Botswana.  The study may also serve as a 
reference for further research in the area of buffer/agency bodies in higher education 
governance. Overall, the study contributes to the body of knowledge on the roles and functions 
of buffer bodies in the governance of higher education. 
1.7 Organisation of the dissertation 
Following on this introductory chapter, chapter 2 provides a review of literature and the 
conceptual framework for the study. It begins with a detailed discussion of the governance of 
higher education. It proceeds to discuss governance models and the assumptions underlying 
these models. It also discusses and conceptualises the notions of ‘buffer body’ and 
‘agencification’ in higher education. It presents a discussion of the different role players in 
higher education and the tensions that may exist between these different role players. It 
concludes by discussing the different roles and functions of buffer bodies in higher education. 
Chapter 3 discusses the way the study was conducted.  It presents a description of the variety 
of approaches adopted for the study. Further, it describes and justifies the design of the study 
and the data collection methods that were employed. Issues such as research ethics and the 
trustworthiness of the study are examined. 
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Chapter 4 sets the context for the case study. It first discusses the higher education system of 
Botswana and then presents the data and findings of the study through an analysis, 
interpretation and discussion of the collected data. The data are presented and analysed using 
tables and figures as well as elaborate discussion involving a triangulation of data. 
 Finally, chapter 5 concludes the study. It includes a discussion of the main findings in terms 
of the conceptual framework and literature, a summary of the study, its conclusions, as well as 
the limitations of this study and recommendations for future research emanating from the 
findings of the study. 
  
 
 
 
 
7 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In keeping with the purpose of the study to examine the roles, functions and perceived 
performance of the TEC in higher education governance in Botswana, along with the potential 
tensions that exist between the TEC and  its related role players in HE, this chapter reviews 
existing literature regarding higher education governance. 
The first section of the literature review highlights the various issues around system level 
higher education governance, with specific reference to the models of higher education 
governance and the role of stakeholders in higher education governance. 
The second section of the literature review begins to develop a conceptual framework for the 
study by reviewing the existing body of literature on buffer bodies in particular. The focus in 
the second section is first on the conceptualisation of buffer bodies and their precarious position 
between autonomy and accountability, and related tensions between buffer bodies, government 
and HEIs. A conceptualisation of the tensions in the roles and functions of buffer bodies, in 
keeping with the research questions of this study follows. The review pays special attention to 
three typical functions of higher education buffer bodies: policy formulation and advisory role 
to the government, quality assurance and coordination, and the planning and development of 
tertiary education. 
The review of conceptual issues in this chapter is further extended by outlining the two sets of 
empirical indicators derived from the existing literature. These indicators guide the 
development of research instruments for conducting a case study. 
2.2 Governance of higher education  
There seems to be an agreement that the governance of higher education is a complex 
phenomenon. It involves the analysis of the steering capacity of the government to influence 
the behaviour of HEIs, the behaviour of institutions themselves to manage their internal 
academic and professional issues, and the way HEIs react to the external environment (van 
Vught, 1993:12).  
Marginson and Considine (2000:15) define governance as “internal relationships, external 
relationships, and the intersection between them”. In some cases, the term is described as being 
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“conceptual shorthand for the way higher education systems and institutions are organized and 
managed” (Neave, 2006:67). It is also understood as the “notion of the relationship or dynamic 
interaction of bodies and groups operating at different levels of higher education system” 
(Amaral, Jones & Karseth, 2002:279). From these definitions, it can be seen that there is no 
commonly accepted definition of governance and it is often, as (Birnbaum, 1998:5) states, 
“…discussed in terms of structure, legal relationship, authority patterns, rights and 
responsibilities and decision making process”.  
 Higher education governance has both internal and external features. The external features 
relate to the system level whereas the internal features relate to the institutional level (Eurydice, 
2008). Zgaga (2005) expands on this view by adding a third feature to the concept of the 
governance of higher education. According to Zgaga (2005) there is also the international or 
global level of higher education governance. There are therefore three levels of higher 
education governance: institutional, systemic and international governance levels. However, 
the most commonly discussed level of governance is the institutional one. This study focuses 
on the system level of higher education governance to shed more light on the relationship 
between the different stakeholders involved in higher education and the related tensions.  
The first or institutional level of governance denotes a situation where HEIs are responsible for 
managing their own activities. Higher education has been undergoing reforms and key among 
these reforms is the notion HEIs freely managing their own affairs and being accountable for 
their own performance (Fielden, 2008). The reforms in higher education demand that HEIs are 
highly autonomous and held responsible for the governance and management of their own 
finances, activities and personnel. These reforms call for HEIs to be afforded the freedom to 
determine their own goals and priorities, employ and dismiss their own staff, determine 
enrolment size and manage their own budget (Saint et al., 2009). As a result, there has been an 
introduction of institutions across the world governed by executive bodies known as councils, 
which hold the rectorate accountable. The rectorate is headed by a rector, president or vice-
chancellor as the executive head of the institution. Institutions also have academic governance 
bodies such as a senate, academic council or academic board responsible for educational 
matters.  
However, as noted by Berdhal (1990), affording HEIs more autonomy creates tension between 
the institutions and the state. These tensions arise from institutions wanting to carry out their 
duties without external interference and, at the same time, being accountable to the state and 
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the nation. There is a danger in affording institutions more autonomy as they might end up not 
being responsive to societal issues and, at the same time, the demands placed on HEIs in terms 
of responding to societal needs may stifle and limit them, affecting their autonomy negatively 
and also limit their ability to be innovative, raise their own funds and also shape their 
curriculum (Berdhal, 1990). 
In addition, the goals and objectives of HEIs may not align with those of the state creating 
tensions between the two. This may affect the internal governance of these institutions. Neave 
(1996:404) observed a worrying trend of external influences reported as mostly responsible for 
the internal reforms of the management structures of universities and colleges. Ultimately this 
calls for a balance to be struck between granting institutions more autonomy and also wanting 
institutions to serve society and account to the state. 
The second governance level, the system level, which this study is mostly interested in, refers 
to the national level higher education system (in most countries), which involves all the 
stakeholders in the governance of higher education ranging from the state, HEIs, buffer bodies 
and the private sector. The history of governance of higher education systems in Africa shows 
that for many years African governments have been the major stakeholders in terms of funding: 
paying students’ fees and funding HEIs. From the 1980s onwards in a context of social and 
economic change on the African continent, African governments were advised by institutions 
such as the World Bank to reduce their funding of higher education (Jegede, 2012; Samoff & 
Carrol, 2004).  
This led to structural adjustment reforms within the higher education systems in countries such 
as South Africa, Ghana, Cameroon and Mauritius. Consequently, the relationship between the 
higher education sector and government shifted and governments were left with the role of 
policy making and funding, other regulatory functions were increasingly given to intermediary 
bodies, such as higher education councils. In effect, HEIs were to be given more autonomy 
allowing them to function without much interference from the government. 
Despite efforts to redefine the role of government in higher education in African countries, 
there are problems that persist relating to separating the HEIs from the state. As noted by 
Bloom, Canning and Chan (2005:7) higher education policy in most African countries is highly 
centralised and, as such, not only restricts the autonomy of HEIs, but also politicises them. It 
is reported that across the majority of African countries, governments still wield tight control 
over higher education policy and institutions (TrustAfrica, 2011). Examples of countries with 
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high levels of policy centralisation include Benin, Tanzania, Cameroon and Madagascar. In 
Benin and Tanzania, for instance, the government is responsible for appointing senior 
university managers, whereas in Cameroon, the Minister of Education possesses supervisory 
authority over HEIs. These arrangements may stifle HEIs as mentioned above and may also 
have implications for their autonomy.   
Bjarnason and Lund (1999) observe that the way governments manage higher education 
systems has a bearing on the success of these institutions. Those governments that exercise a 
tight control over the higher education system can limit the potential of the sector to respond 
to the demands of the sector and vice versa. However, it has also been observed that a lack of 
centralisation and system oversight allows the mushrooming of ‘fly-by-night’ private 
institutions that provide low-quality education at a high cost.  
2.2.1 Shifts in higher education governance 
Traditionally, funding and orientation of the higher education system has been the prerogative 
of nation states through traditional state-centred governance structures. Thus, most of the 
literature on higher education governance tends to focus on the relationship between the state 
and HEIs, particularly following widespread criticism of the traditional state-centred 
governance model. This criticism led to significant changes made to governance structures by 
the end of 1990s. Several factors initiated these changes, among them economic challenges, 
ideological shifts and pragmatic motives (Kickert, 1997; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). Firstly, 
according to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000), the economic recession between 1980 and 1983 and 
consequent tightening of public expenditure have had a significant bearing on the changes in 
higher education governance. The economic downturn forced nation states to cut budgets on 
higher education and focus more on other development issues.  
Secondly, with the advent of globalisation and internationalisation, market-oriented 
approaches to governance have been preferred in place of traditional state-centred modes of 
governance. In addition, powerful international organisations such as the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organisation are encouraging changes geared 
towards the involvement of multiple stakeholders in the governance of higher education in 
order to allow higher education to be more responsive to societal needs thereby making it 
relevant to their needs. 
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Thirdly, governments have been found wanting in the governance of higher education and in 
some instances have been blamed for not providing education responsive to societal needs 
(Pollitt, 1996).  
Lastly, there has been a strong case made to allow the markets to regulate higher education. 
Proponents of this move motivate that competition will remedy the inefficient allocation of 
resources within the higher education sector. As such, market mechanisms are seen as the 
relevant instruments to guarantee more options, higher quality and lower prices in the higher 
education sector (Dill, 1997). 
The resultant shifts in higher education governance introduced other stakeholders at various 
levels of governance to play a key role in the coordination of higher education, thus leading to 
alternative modes of governance (Kooiman, 2000). This shift in governance from a single 
dominant role player to one involving multiple stakeholders is described in literature as a move 
from ‘government to governance’ (Kooiman, 2000). It symbolises the emphasis on shared 
governance as opposed to governance by a single authority (Kooiman, 2000) and, as a 
consequence, the state’s role has been redefined to accommodate them (Van Kersbergen & 
Van Waarden, 2001).  
The changing role of the state means that the state has had to delegate some of its 
responsibilities to other stakeholders. This process includes granting of autonomy to HEIs to 
allow them to govern themselves without outside interference. This move is considered key to 
allowing markets to allocate resources equitably.  
Furthermore, the state has delegated most of its traditional roles to parastatals, buffer bodies 
and other organisations, such as research councils. The state’s new role can now be described 
as facilitative, whereby it only deals with higher education at a system level, primarily limited 
to issues of policy.  
More importantly, the shift from the traditional state-centred approaches in higher education 
governance to a multi-stakeholder approach has not been a smooth one. Despite efforts to move 
away from the traditional state-centred approach, some governments have not fully endorsed 
this trend. Even though the state has delegated some of the responsibilities to parastatals, buffer 
bodies or agencies, research councils and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), it 
continues to heavily influence decisions in higher education governance beyond its mandate 
leading to tensions between the functions of such bodies and between the stakeholders 
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themselves. This aspect of higher education governance has not been given much attention in 
literature, hence the focus of this study on the tensions between the roles and functions of 
intermediary bodies. 
To help highlight the tensions in the governance of higher education, Burton Clark’s (1983) 
triangle of coordination is used to offer insights into the dynamics involved in the governance 
of higher education in terms of the stakeholders involved (see Figure 1 below). The triangle 
uses three major stakeholders involved in the governance of higher education to help explain 
changes in the higher education sector. These are the state, the academic oligarchy and the 
market.  
The following section discusses Burton Clark’s triangle of coordination and tensions within 
the governance of higher education. 
2.2.2 Clark’s triangle of coordination 
The classic work of Burton Clark attempted to analyse the coordination of the higher education 
system using three dimensions: the state, the academic oligarchy and the market (Clark, 1983). 
According to Clark, the three dimensions of coordination are positioned in a triangular manner. 
The corners of the triangle represent “the extreme of one form and a minimum of the two, and 
locations within the triangle represent combinations of the three elements in different degrees” 
(Clark, 1983:142). With this triangle of coordination, Clark depicts the governance of higher 
education as a struggle between many forces, which include the state, academics and the market 
(see Figure 1 below). 
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Figure 1: Triangle of coordination  
 
Source: Burton Clark, 1983. 
The three forces of authority are roughly equivalent and enjoy differing levels of power relative 
to one another in different national settings or in the same country at different times (Salazar 
& Leihy, 2013:53). As such, this breeds tensions between the different roles and functions of 
the stakeholders concerned.  
Clark’s triangular space is one delimited by tensions between the state, market and the 
organisational arrangements within higher education, and this depends on the relationship 
between the different role players (Salazar & Leihy, 2013). The tensions between the three 
forces of authority manifest themselves in many ways. The state and the market are viewed as 
opposite extremes of a continuum. According to Clark (1979:263-264), ‘‘there exist different 
unexpected mixes of coordination and groups of stakeholders.’’ In one of the scenarios, 
academic oligarchs and bureaucrats work together to repel political forces and eliminate market 
influence. In another permutation, political figures and administrators work together to gain as 
much control as possible over the higher education sector. In yet another scenario, academic 
oligarchs could assume the control of higher education thereby sidelining other stakeholders. 
 
Market 
State Authority 
Academic Oligarchy 
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Overall there are different outcomes that may result from the interplay between the three 
different forces of academic control. 
According to Lindblom (1977), the interplay between the forces of state control, market control 
and academic oligarchy create a scalar tug of war tension. Most of the literature (Van Vught, 
1989; Neave & Van Vught, 1991; Goedegebuure et al., 1992; De Boer, Enders & Schimank, 
2007) on shifts in the governance of HE reveals that the state is losing ground in control of HE 
governance and markets are replacing the state. Although this general trend is observed in the 
literature, Schuetze and Mendiola (2012:9) argue that markets have not entirely displaced 
academic values and the traditional role of the state has not disappeared. In fact, the HE system 
is faced with dynamic processes of negotiation and exchange between new and traditional 
forms of coordination. As a result the new forms of coordination intermingle with traditional 
forms of coordination and in the process create tensions.  
Consequently the shifts in HE governance are a mixture of the forces of governance positioned 
at opposing ends. This situation creates tensions between the different roles and functions of 
the stakeholders involved.  
Clark’s model is discussed here in the context of the role played by intermediary bodies in the 
coordination of higher education. Although Clark (1983) does not emphasise the importance 
of buffer bodies in the triangle of coordination, Boateng (2010) argues that buffer bodies are 
subsumed under what he terms political coordination; this involves political actors and 
institutions like pressure groups, the judiciary and legislature and intermediary bodies. These 
actors demonstrate their interest in higher education coordination through the use of 
resolutions, legislation and rulings. Intermediary bodies are typically legally constituted bodies 
with the mandate of coordinating, regulating or funding higher education. In their endeavour 
to carry out their mandate, they have to negotiate very tough terrains. El-Khawas (1992) 
observes that the position that these bodies find themselves in is a very precarious one and one 
subject to vulnerability. She argues that most buffer bodies are not able to sustain themselves 
as neutral parties standing in between the government and HEIs; most tilt to either the 
government or HEIs. Several factors play a role in influencing which way a buffer tilts, 
including the source of funding, governance structure, and patterns of reporting (El-Khawas, 
1992). Consequently, different buffer bodies may find themselves occupying different 
positions in Clark’s triangle.  
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Although Clark’s triangle of coordination represented a novel idea in the field of HE, some 
scholars have criticised the model as lacking dynamism in that it only makes sense in the 
context of the conditions that prevailed in the 1980s (Jarausch, 1985). Nonetheless, the model 
provided a platform for other governance models to be developed, as will be discussed below.  
Following on Clark’s triangle of coordination, some scholars have used it as basis for 
developing higher education steering models (Olsen, 1998; Maassen & Cloete, 2002; Dobbins 
& Knill, 2009). The models developed by these scholars vary on their intended use. The state 
control and state supervision models are of significance to this study. 
2.3 Governance models 
Following on from Clark’s path-breaking work, the governance of HEIs is explained in terms 
of the relationship between the government, institutions, private sector and civil society (Neave 
& Vught, 1994, Moja & Cloete, 1996). Neave and van Vught (1994) differentiate between two 
governmental steering models in the governance of higher education, namely state control and 
state supervision. They argue that other models are variations of these two (National Council 
for Higher Education [NCHE], 1996). Cloete, Moja and Muller (1996) concur with this and 
have since introduced state interference as a third model, considered typical in many African 
higher education systems (NCHE, 1996). These models are discussed below. 
2.3.1 State control model 
The literature defines the state control model as a system in which the state assumes full control 
of key aspects of the higher education sector (Clark, 1983; NCHE, 1996; Kehm & Lazendorf, 
2006). Under this model, the governance of higher education is assigned to a government 
ministry. The respective ministry will be tasked with admissions and curricula activities as well 
as the appointment of personnel (Dobbins & Knill, 2009). Most importantly, the respective 
ministry is fully responsible for monitoring the quality of education.  
The state control model is characterised by mechanisms through which the government 
controls the higher education sector. Neave and van Vught (1994) assert that governments use 
extensive control mechanisms and stringent rules to regulate higher education. As the Task 
Force for Higher Education and Society (TFHES, 2000:53) state, “state control of higher 
education has tended to undermine many major principles of good governance. The direct 
involvement of politicians has generally politicized higher education, widening the possibilities 
of corruption, nepotism, and political opportunism”. This model of governance represents a 
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top-down approach where institutions do not have a say in how they should be governed. This 
model does not recognise the loosely coupled and multi-dimensional character of HEIs (van 
Vught, 1993).  
However, McDaniel (1996) argues that there is a general acceptance that governments have 
legitimate interest in exercising influence on HE systems. The role of the government is further 
emphasised by De Moor (1993:61, in McDaniel, 1996:140) by arguing that: 
No country in the world has a government which does not retain some 
control over its universities… Universities are public services. The 
question therefore is not whether government should have some control 
over universities, but rather, how much control and where it should be 
exercised. 
It could therefore be considered normal for governments to have a role in steering their higher 
education system. However, as observed in the literature, the state control model is common in 
developing countries where decisions made by governments are more often than not politically 
motivated making it very difficult for institutions to manoeuvre. Ajayi, Goma and Johnson 
(1996) have characterised the relationship between HEIs and the government as one involving 
conflict rather than partnerships. This kind of relationship causes tensions between the 
government and these institutions. These tensions, which are of interest to this study, will be 
discussed in detail further on. 
2.3.2 State supervision model 
The state supervision model is characterised by monitoring and feedback. In this model, the 
role of the state is to exert influence from a distance, thereby leaving more autonomy to the 
HEIs. Van Vught (1989:333) noted that “the state does not intrude into the higher education 
system by means of detailed regulation and tight control”. In this model the government is 
predominantly an actor watching the rules of the game played by relatively autonomous players 
and it changes the rules when the game is no longer able to lead to satisfactory results. 
 
 
 
Compared to the model of state control, we expect the state supervising 
model to offer a better fit. This model seems to be better equipped to be 
as a general incitement towards innovations in a higher education system. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
It leaves sufficient room for semi-autonomous professionals and basic 
units and it does not try to coordinate the large variety of a higher 
education system in a limited set of rules (Neave & van Vught, 1994:19). 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a shift in terms of the governance of higher education from 
state control to state supervision (Maassen & van Vught, 1994). This shift mirrors the changing 
role of the state in higher education in which the state is moving away from a controlling role 
to an increasingly supervisory role (Maassen & van Vught, 1994). Maassen (2009:99) is of the 
view that the “supervisory role of the state would lead to a better performance of higher 
education than a controlling role”. 
In addition, the market is expected to play a significant role in driving the higher education 
sector (Mok, 2005; Mills, 2007; Robertson, 2010). Economic events have also affected the 
relationship between governments and HEIs. Recent trends in the transformation of higher 
education where emphasis is placed on allowing the market to steer higher education have 
redefined the relationship between the state and HEIs (Torres & Schugurensky, 2002; 
Alexander, 2000).  
Due to the demands placed on governments by economic trends, governments are no longer 
receptive to the traditional self-regulatory processes that have dominated universities for 
centuries. In fact, Kivisto (2007) notes governments’ doubts about efficient resource allocation 
and effective cost containment on the part of HEIs. Issues raised include a lack of trust and 
confidence between government and officials from institutions, suspicions about the accuracy 
and relevance of data provided by institutions, and a lack of confidence in the traditionally 
decentralised, loosely coupled governance processes internal to these institutions (Schmidtlein, 
2004).  
In order to respond to economic and financial pressures, governments have therefore redefined 
their relationship with institutions by forcing institutions to become more accountable, efficient 
and more productive in the use of publicly generated resources (Alexander, 2000). This is to 
ensure that higher education plays its role in transforming the existing low-wage economic 
structures into high performance, technology-based economies. As such, governments have 
resolved to include higher education in their economic development strategies. This approach 
comes at a cost to HEIs. Neave (1994) observed that this new arrangement seems to be 
threatening the internal affairs of these institutions by removing the function of collegial 
steering, which formerly had control over teaching and research activities. With this new 
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arrangement, academics are concerned that the autonomous control of academics over some 
functions of HEIs is being eroded in the process of exposing institutions to the rigours of market 
demands. 
Despite the current trend in most countries of moving from the state control model to the state 
supervisory model, some developing countries such as Cameroon and Benin are adhering to 
state-controlled higher education systems (Hoare, 2007). As noted by TFHES (2000:53) the 
state supervision model “aims at balancing the state’s responsibility to protect and promote the 
public’s interest with an individual institution’s need for academic freedom and autonomy”. 
To achieve the balance between accountability and autonomy, countries have moved to what 
is described as “the agencification of the higher education sector” (Pollitt, Bathgate, Caulfield, 
Smullen & Talbot, 2001). This will be discussed further below. 
2.3.3 State interference model 
The state intervention model of higher education governance can be described as a version of 
the state-control model. The major difference between the state control and state intervention 
is that the state intervention is not a systematic model. In this case, intervention occurs when 
HEIs hinder the development path or perceived political direction of the state. The key 
characteristics of this model include a weak education ministry and education department, and 
a poorly trained bureaucracy unable to implement higher education policy (Cloete et al., 1996). 
In this model, the limited capacity of the state to supervise or control the sector is therefore 
compensated by interference in the sector as crises in the system or in individual institutions 
surface. 
2.3.4 Summary of higher education governance models 
The sections above have provided a background on higher education governance models. These 
models include state control, state supervision and state interference. The models are all based 
on the role played by the state. It is evident that the models follow a continuum where the state 
control model represents an extreme of state involvement and state supervision represents an 
extreme case of low state involvement. Having mapped these three generic HE governance 
models, there is also a need to discuss the notion of ‘agencification’. The agencification of 
higher education is becoming a popular way of regulating higher education (Gornitzka et al., 
2004). As observed under the different models of HE governance described above, the state 
takes a central stage in the governance of higher education. Through agencification, the state 
puts in place a contractual agreement between itself and an agent who is given the mandate of 
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regulating some aspects of higher education on behalf of the state. The following section 
discusses the ‘agencification’ of higher education. 
2.4 Agencification of higher education and related trends 
The literature broadly defines ‘agencification’ as a process of delegation and devolution where 
certain functions and responsibilities, such as those related to funding, are granted to public 
bodies (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2002). These 
bodies may still be legally part of the government or they might acquire their own legal persona 
and so Gill (2002) defines agencification as a process of moving some of the existing or new 
functions of the government to subsidiaries of ministries or departments. These two definitions 
are very important in the analysis of the higher education sector and the tensions that are found 
in the sector.  
The first definition by OECD implies that the delegation and devolution of powers still remain 
with the government, albeit at a different level. In other words, existing or new bodies given 
certain roles to perform on behalf of the government and are legally part of the government. 
This aspect of agencification is important in higher education as it helps explain the tensions 
in the HE system as a result of the shift from traditional state-centred governance models to 
more market-oriented governance models. 
The higher education sector, controlled mostly by the government, has faced serious problems 
stemming from the ‘love-hate relationship’ between the government and the HEIs (Kivisto, 
2005). As observed in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989), the relationship between the 
government and HEIs is one characterised by tensions emanating from the pursuit of divergent 
goals. This relationship is described as complex with multiple dimensions. Owing to this 
uneasy relationship between the state and HEIs, governments as regulating authorities have 
made significant changes to the higher education sector (Eisenhardt, 1989). Such changes relate 
to the size, structure, funding arrangements and focus of HEIs so that they can better serve the 
public (Jongbloed, 2000; Jongbloed & Vossensteyn, 2001; Leruth, Paul & Premchand, 2006). 
Consequently, the roles and functions of the state relating to funding, quality assurance and 
many other aspects have been delegated to intermediary bodies, such as quality assurance 
agencies, non-governmental organisations and academic bodies. It is believed that agencifying 
some of the government departments will help governments work better and become more 
economically astute. 
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In a nutshell, the international trends in the governance of higher education are summarised as 
follows by Saint et al. (2009:11): (1) “withdrawal of the state from the control of higher 
education”; (2) “creation of agents of higher education i.e. buffer organisations/bodies”; (3) 
“adoption of funding models to give institutions more leeway in sourcing out funds to run their 
institutions”; (4) “affirmation of the university governing board as accountable to the minister 
or buffer body”; (5) “establishment of external agencies to monitor quality of education”; (6) 
“development of new forms of accountability where institutions report on performance and 
outcomes in line with national goals and institutional targets”; and (7) “gradual withdrawal of 
the state from decisions relating to the appointment of the chair of the governing board, its 
members and the chief executive of the institution”. 
Literature looking at the transition of the governance of higher education systems from state 
control to market-oriented models is dominated by discussions on the merits and demerits of 
such a trend (Pollitt et al., 2001; McLendon, 2003). However, very little attention has been 
accorded the tensions and conflicts that come with the shift from a centralised approach where 
the government is in control of higher education to a decentralised approach where buffer 
bodies and other bodies are entrusted with guiding the higher education sector and individual 
institutions. Therefore, in transforming the governance of higher education from state control 
to state supervision and the establishment of intermediary bodies, there are bound to be tensions 
and conflicts between the roles of buffer bodies and its stakeholders.  
 
The tensions and conflicts may take different forms depending on the dynamics involved. In 
one instance, tensions and conflicts may occur if there are different organisations carrying out 
the same function. In this case, HEIs may find themselves caught between satisfying the 
demands of the different organisations and in the process creating tensions between the roles 
and functions of buffer bodies. There are also tensions and conflicts that revolve around path 
dependencies, especially on the part of governments, as well as already established HEIs with 
pre-existing arrangements making it difficult for a buffer body to carry out its mandate. Many 
different forms of tensions could surface and the following sections illustrate how these 
tensions can manifest themselves in higher education governance.    
2.5 Role players in higher education 
According to Lazerretti and Tavoletti (2006), higher education governance is characterised by 
many stakeholders. These stakeholders range from the state, HEIs, labour and the scientific 
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community to professionals and the wider society. It has been argued that the relationship 
between the different stakeholders is one characterised by goal conflicts (Braun & Guston, 
2003; Kivisto, 2007). However, this section will only focus on the role of the state, institutions 
and the society and how tensions within the roles of these institutions manifest. 
Throughout the world, the state has been the major stakeholder. As the major stakeholder in 
higher education with an interest in serving the public good, the state funded and regulated 
higher education and, in return, institutions provided education to the citizenry (Weerts & 
Ronca, 2006). However, this relationship is not always a smooth one as evidenced by trends in 
the governance of higher education. Up until the late 1990s, the state has single-handedly been 
responsible for shaping societal expectations from higher education. This role was common in 
Western European countries and was transferred to governments of colonised countries (Neave 
& van Vught, 1991; Cloete et al., 1996). The United States (US) higher education model is the 
only exception as state influence is very limited (Neave, 1994). The trends in the governance 
of higher education have shown that countries are gradually moving away from the state-
controlled HE system (Neave, 1994). Several factors are responsible for this trend. Key among 
them is the economic meltdown which has seriously affected state involvement in higher 
education (World Bank, 2006). In 2013, developing countries are experiencing slow economic 
growth, and high income countries are faced with contracting economies and tighter credit 
conditions. In Africa, countries like South Africa are reported to be experiencing shrinkage of 
government expenditure on higher education (De Villers & Steyn, 2006: Wangenge-Ouma & 
Cloete, 2008). The economic crisis coupled with global diffusion of new modes of governance 
has resulted in the state taking a step back from complete control of higher education systems. 
Consequently, governments have been forced by economic circumstances to relinquish some 
of its roles and pave the way for market regulation (Amaral & Magalhães, 2007). Under this 
arrangement, institutions are forced to compete under ‘market-like’ conditions with less 
interference from the government. Despite the call for a market-centred approach, there are 
some governments not willing to relinquish all their power and grant HEIs absolute autonomy 
(Neave & Vught, 1991). Therefore the trend is towards governments having a certain level of 
control over higher education while leaving most of the details to HEIs. 
HEIs are one of the most important role players in higher education. During the era of academic 
oligarchy they were responsible for running the HE sector through academic bodies (Hearn & 
Griswold, 1994; Cloete et al., 1996; Graham, 1989). The intention was to facilitate a conducive 
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environment for professors to operate autonomously. As such, academics want to exercise 
control over the conditions of their work. Scott (1995) summarised academic professionals’ 
wishes into three categories. Firstly, academics seek regulative control to determine what 
actions are to be prohibited and sanctioned. Secondly, academics want to exercise normative 
control to determine how authority in higher education should be distributed. Lastly, they want 
to have what is termed as cognitive control. In cognitive control academics want to determine 
the type of problems that should fall under their ambit and how these problems should be 
categorised and processed. With all these demands made by academic professionals, it is 
important to trace the developments in higher education to establish how academic 
professionals have been able to exercise them.  
At a global level the developments in higher education show that HEIs once had more leeway 
in terms of running their affairs during the era of academic oligarchy before the 1950s. 
However, after the 1950s, most governments in the developed world decided to oversee the 
governance of higher education. Alexander (2000) has observed that states were forced to 
redefine their relationship with HEIs due to the changing economic environment where higher 
education is expected to play a leading role by supplying quality graduates. By redefining their 
relationship with HEIs, states are now forcing these institutions to be more accountable and 
responsive to societal needs by crafting regulations meant to govern higher education (Saint et 
al., 2009). For instance, Campos (2004) asserts that implementing accreditation systems had a 
significant effect on HEIs. Some of the institutions’ goals, such as increasing enrolment 
numbers create tensions for the higher education sector as they also compromise the quality of 
education offered in higher education institutions.  
Society is also one of the most important actors in higher education. It comprises many groups 
ranging from students and parents to the private sector and special interest groups. Over the 
years, the role of the society in higher education has been increasing owing to social demands 
regarding higher education such as quality of education offered and the ability of higher 
education institutions to respond to societal needs (Cloete et al., 1996). One of the challenges 
facing higher education in developing countries is the increasing enrolment of students with 
diverse needs. Some of the concerns raised by students include the poor quality of higher 
education, political interference, and poor management of HEIs, reduced government funding 
among others (Nkinyangi, 1991; Saint et al., 2009). 
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The private sector has also expressed displeasure with the quality of education offered by HEIs. 
Most importantly, graduates from these institutions are reportedly not ready for the corporate 
world prompting the private sector to question the quality of education on offer (Campbell & 
Rozsnyai, 2002; Varghese, 2012).  
All of the concerns raised by different stakeholders indicate disparities in expectations of higher 
education and each places pressure on the sector, leading to further tension regarding 
governance. The following section discusses the introduction of buffer bodies and/or agents in 
higher education and the subsequent tensions that may arise. 
2.6 Conceptualising the ‘buffer body’ and the tension between autonomy and 
accountability 
The foregoing section has shown that the existing literature on higher education governance 
considers the roles and expectations of different stakeholders, which involve tensions in the 
governance of the sector and different models of governance. This section considers the 
conceptualisation of buffer bodies and related principles of autonomy and accountability. It 
concludes with a brief discussion of the different functions of buffer bodies relevant for 
conceptualising the phenomenon of buffer bodies and how this could provide heuristics for 
answering research questions. 
2.6.1 The notion of ‘buffer body’ in higher education 
The concept of buffer body originates in the United Kingdom with the creation of the 
University Grants Committee (UGC). The underlying rationale was “to act as a specialist 
source of advice to government on higher education policy and to give those within the sector 
some confidence that their affairs were being managed by people who understood their culture 
and their concerns” (Fielden, 2000:17). De Boer (1992:36) provided a broad description of a 
buffer body as “an intermediary organization looking after and representing individual and 
common interest in a certain domain”. Saint et al. (2009:14) suggest that these bodies “literally 
buffer the ministry of education from the periodic conflicts that may arise between members 
of the university community and the government by providing an initial recourse for dispute 
resolution”. Similarly, they also:  
 
… serve to shield tertiary institutions from intervention by the 
government leaders since these bodies are usually staffed with former 
university administrators and academicians who generally understand 
the organization and culture better than senior ministerial officials, and 
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who may possess a network of informal contacts in the university 
community that allows “off record” problem solving conversations  to be 
pursued at a level of trust that may often be lacking between ministry and 
university leaders (Saint et al., 2009:14). 
Neave (1992:10) distinguishes between three major roles of buffer bodies: (1) “those that 
advise and coordinate”; (2) “those that have powers of allocation”; and (3) “those that serve as 
arenas for debate and discussion”. Examples of buffer bodies are quality assurance agencies, 
funding councils and research councils. As already stated, a buffer body is often known as a 
national council of higher education, tertiary education council/commission or national higher 
education commission or may be named more specifically in relation to its particular function, 
for example, higher education quality committee.  
Although their mandates are many and differ from one country to another, these organisations 
are meant to facilitate a relationship between the state and HEIs. However, such bodies are 
generally tasked with allocating public funds, quality assurance and regulating HEIs. 
The intention of having a buffer body is threefold. Firstly, the intention may be to increase the 
‘instruments of public purpose’ that reinforce the administrative layer between institutions and 
central government. Secondly, a buffer may have been established to remove or prevent the 
development of rigid central controls. Thirdly, it may be intended as a means to increase and 
improve the interplay between higher education institutions and the nation (NCHE, 1996:183). 
There is therefore also a wide range of roles and functions for these kinds of organisations. 
According to El-Khawas (1992:18), typically, a buffer body in higher education will have one 
or more of the following functions: (1) “Planning and policy formulation”; (2) “evaluation and 
monitoring”; (3) “allocation decisions for scarce resources”; and (4) “sponsorship of reform 
and innovation”. The literature on the various functions of buffer bodies is discussed in further 
detail below. Specifically, the focus is on the high-level tensions between autonomy and 
accountability and how these manifest in terms of the relationship between the state and HEIs, 
as well as the relationship between government, buffer body and HEIs. 
2.6.2 Conceptualising autonomy 
Closely related to the concept of governance is the concept of autonomy. Autonomy is a multi-
dimensional concept that shows variations based on the level of analysis, that is, the basic unit 
level, institutional level and system level (Becher & Kogan, 1992). It entails “… having the 
ability to think, decide and act … freely and independently without hindrance (Keenan, 
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1999:557). The use of this term varies from one field to another. However, in higher education, 
the meaning of the term autonomy is twofold. Firstly, autonomy is used in higher education to 
describe the ability of HEIs to determine their own goals, set their own agendas, select their 
leaders, appoint and dismiss their staff, determine their student enrolment size and manage 
their own budget (Saint et al., 2009:6). Secondly, autonomy is viewed from the perspective of 
buffer bodies as the ability of buffer bodies to function without outside interference. The two 
facets of autonomy will be discussed here to show how tensions in higher education manifest 
themselves. 
Institutional autonomy is most commonly understood as “the degree of freedom the university 
has to steer itself” (Askling, Bauer & Marton, 1999:81). According to Berdhal (1990:23) 
autonomy can be defined in two conceptually distinct ways: procedural and substantive. 
Procedural autonomy is “the power of the university or college in its corporate form to 
determine the means by which its goals and programmes will be pursued”- the how of the 
academe. Substantive autonomy is “the power of the university or college in its corporate form 
to determine its own goals and programmes” or the ‘what’ of the academe (Berdhal, 1990). 
Ajayi et al. (1996) are of the view that autonomy does not guarantee independence from the 
state. Rather, it is needed to renegotiate the changing circumstances from time to time. 
Although HEIs should be granted autonomy, the state still has a major role to play in 
substantive policies. Therefore there is a need for a balance between the substantive autonomy 
and the state’s role. This balance is what Hall, Symes and Luescher (2002) refer to as 
“conditional autonomy”.  
Maton (2005) distinguishes between two types of autonomy: positional autonomy and 
relational autonomy. By positional autonomy, Maton (2005:697) refers to “the nature of 
relations between specific positions in the social dimension of a context of field and positions 
in other contexts”. To clarify this, Maton argues that in a situation where the positions of the 
governance of HEIs and buffer bodies are occupied by people from politics or industries, such 
institutions exhibit relatively weaker positional autonomy and vice versa. Relational autonomy, 
on the other hand, is used to refer to relations between principles of relation. This describes a 
situation where ways of working within higher education are either sourced from outside or 
inside. 
The autonomy of buffer bodies is one critical element of this study that needs to be adequately 
discussed to establish levels of autonomy. Autonomy is very important because when accorded 
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to buffer bodies it gives them more responsibility and makes them answerable for their own 
actions (Keenan, 1999). However, there seems to be inadequate literature on the autonomy of 
buffer organisations. Instead more focus has been accorded the autonomy of HEIs (Saint et al., 
2009). Nonetheless there are some scholars who have attempted to discuss this subject albeit 
at a smaller scale. El-Khawas’ (1992) article titled “Are buffer organizations doomed to fail - 
Inevitable dilemmas and tensions” argues that in most cases buffer organisations are very weak 
and therefore yield relatively weak autonomy. The only exception is the defunct United 
Kingdom’s University Grants Committee, which was a very powerful and independent buffer 
body created in 1918 to serve as a platform to solve issues of university funding in the United 
Kingdom.  
2.6.3 Accountability in higher education 
Over the years higher education has attracted interest from various role players ranging from 
the government, society, civil organisations and the private sector. These role players have 
certain expectations on higher education. In addition, the higher education sector has over the 
years been funded through public funds. As a result, the different role players want HEIs to 
account for their actions. Saint et al. (2009:7) therefore define accountability as “the clear 
assignment of responsibility for efficient use of resources to produce results and the 
mechanisms whereby this performance can be monitored”. 
 
Accountability is considered as the “requirement to demonstrate responsible actions to one or 
more external constituencies” (van Vught, 1994:355). Its main function is “to constrain the 
corruptions of power, including fraud, manipulation, malfeasance and the like” (Trow, 
1996:310). “Accountability does not imply uncontrolled interference, but it does impose a 
requirement to periodically explain actions and have successes and failures examined in a 
transparent fashion” (TFHES, 2000:61). This normally takes place in the form of stakeholder 
representation in decision-making bodies, external evaluation by quality assurance bodies and 
regulation by buffer bodies.  
Buffer bodies are also required to account for their actions through a number of mediums. The 
way in which they account for their actions can also create tensions between their different 
roles and functions. In order to explain this conundrum, two examples of buffer bodies are 
used. Firstly, buffer bodies formed and fully funded by the government account to the minister 
of higher education. In this case, HEIs will always feel aggrieved as this arrangement creates 
tensions between a buffer body and its stakeholder. This is in contrast with buffer bodies 
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formed and funded by higher education representatives and those from the community and the 
private sector. Such buffer bodies by default are forced to account to HEIs and the community 
at large. 
A discussion on autonomy and accountability as they apply to buffer bodies suggests the 
existence of potential tensions between the different roles and functions of buffer bodies and 
its associated stakeholders. These tensions are very critical to this study and the following 
section will discuss these tensions in detail.  
2.6.4 Tensions between buffer bodies, government and higher education institutions 
This section discusses the relationship between buffer bodies, governments and HEIs. 
Subsequently, the tensions between them are discussed. 
As observed in the literature, the introduction of buffer bodies in higher education meant that 
the role played by the government and HEIs changed significantly. This means that buffer 
bodies find themselves caught between serving the interest of the state and those of the HEIs. 
The relationship between these three organs has engendered much debate. These debates are 
centred around the autonomy of buffer bodies as their autonomy is often heavily dependent on 
how much power these organisations possess. As a result, in some countries, governments have 
granted buffer bodies absolute autonomy, whereas in others, the autonomy of such bodies is 
limited. This has led to contrasting records of success for buffer bodies in different countries. 
The relationship between buffer bodies, governments and HEI’s is one that is characterised by 
tensions (de Rudder, 1992). These tensions manifest themselves in the form of government 
interference in the operations of buffer institutions, buffer bodies failing to live up to their 
expectations and HEIs demanding more institutional autonomy (De Boer, 1992; El-Khawas, 
1992). 
Inherent to the relationship between the state and HEIs is the conflicting desires of three parties. 
Lane (2007:615) views the relationship between the state and HEIs as “intricate and clumsy 
with both partners often trying to play the role of the lead dancer”. On one hand, HEIs want to 
be granted autonomy and, on the other hand, states want to exercise control and accountability 
over HEIs. As a result, buffer bodies, in their pursuit to fulfil their mandate, are always caught 
between needing to please the state and HEIs. This is difficult to achieve as the demands of the 
two stakeholders are positioned at opposing ends. El-Khawas (1992) acknowledges that being 
in the middle is difficult. As a matter of fact, buffer bodies eventually move towards serving 
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one party more than the other. This creates some form of tension for a buffer body as it cannot 
maintain legitimacy with both parties.  
Given this background, El-Khawas (1992) describes the role of buffer organisations as a 
‘contradiction’. This contradiction is rooted in the structure of the organisation, the scope of 
the agenda and the various cultural issues relating to the buffer organisations. For buffer 
organisations formed by the government and funded by the government and reporting to the 
government, the expectation is that such organisations will favour the government over HEIs. 
The scope of the agenda has also been found to influence the role of buffer bodies in that 
organisations with a narrow mandate are able to survive easily as compared to those with 
multiple agendas (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Lastly, cultural issues and traditions are also reported to have an influence in the way a buffer 
body functions. Traditions include legal recognition of institutional and academic autonomy 
and the quality of organisational leaders and political leaders (El-Khawas, 1992). For example, 
in a situation where a crisis arises and institutions want to challenge the government, they need 
to be legally recognised and also poses leaders whose positions are taken seriously. All these 
factors lend buffer bodies to manipulation if not carefully dealt with and therefore affect its 
autonomy. 
2.7 Conceptualising tensions in the roles and functions of buffer bodies 
Originally the roles and functions of buffer bodies in higher education were not easily 
understood by scholars or by the people these bodies serve (El-Khawas 1992). More recently, 
a deepened understanding of the roles and functions of buffer bodies is evident, especially in 
literature discussing quality assurance in higher education. Yet, over and above quality 
assurance, there is a wide range of roles and functions for buffer type bodies, including those 
mentioned by El-Khawas (1992:18). A more elaborate description of commonly performed 
functions of buffer bodies is provided by Schmidtlein and Berdhal (1992:32):  
(1) “Planning: is the top priority function of any buffer body and it includes activities such 
as examining higher education needs, establishing goals, determining resource 
requirements and recommending priorities.” 
(2) “Policy analysis and problem resolution: conducting special studies on long term issues 
such as funding alternatives.” 
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(3) “Mission definition: defining institutional missions in terms of degree awarded, 
programmes offered and clientele served.” 
(4) “Budget development: participating in budget formulation, developing budget process, 
conducting studies of fund uses and examining financial procedures to ensure 
accountability.” 
(5) “Academic programme review: reviewing and approving proposals for new programs 
and, in some states, regularly examining existing programs to curb unnecessary 
duplication.” 
(6) “Programme administration: administering state higher education programmes such as 
student financial aid and licensure and regulation of non-degree granting and out-of-
state institutions, as well as cross-sector cooperative arrangements such as library and 
computer networks.” 
(7) “Information, monitoring and accountability systems: developing and maintaining 
state-wide information systems and using these systems to monitor trends and 
performance of institutions.” 
(8) “Quality initiatives - developing policies and administering programmes designed to 
stimulate or mandate institutional attention to state priorities.” 
The complex role of higher education buffer bodies is not fully understood in that it not only 
involves the complex terrain between government and the higher education sector/stakeholders 
(as discussed in relation to the notion of buffer body and the principles of autonomy and 
accountability above), but also between different functions. While under normal 
circumstances, a buffer body carries out only one step in a process (El-Khawas, 1992), the case 
where a body performs several steps in a process or several complimentary or contradictory 
functions can be anticipated.  
Considering the policy life cycle (see Figure 2 below) a buffer body may be involved in various 
steps in this process including advice on policy and policy formulation, policy implementation 
(e.g. quality assurance), policy monitoring, and policy evaluation and review (including 
advising on policy change). 
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Figure 2: Policy life cycle
 
Source: Adopted and modified from Badat, (2001). 
There are a number of factors that can be used to assess tensions between the roles and 
functions of buffer bodies as demonstrated by the discussion above. These include the 
governance structure of buffer bodies, their autonomy, accountability structures and the nature 
of their mandate. When studying tensions between the roles and functions of buffer bodies it 
is important to clearly state what exactly constitutes the tensions, as demonstrated in literature, 
and how that relates to the study. The tensions between the roles and functions of buffer bodies 
have not been given much attention in the literature and as such there is limited evidence of the 
tensions. However El-Khawas (1992) has attempted to discuss some of the tensions inherent 
between the roles and functions of buffer bodies and these will be used to inform the direction 
in which this study is going. 
The funding of buffer bodies is an important aspect that can be used to help understand tensions 
between the roles and functions of buffer bodies. For buffer bodies legally established and 
wholly funded by government, the tendency is towards favouring the government against HEIs. 
In this case buffer bodies view the government as their “boss” and, as such, feel that they are 
accountable to it; this is in contrast to a situation in which a buffer body is formed by volunteers 
and HEI representatives. Such a body will naturally safeguard the interests of HEIs. However, 
El-Khawas (1992) has also noted that there are exceptions. For example, the German Rectors 
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Conference, despite being funded by the government, was able to maintain its independence 
from the government for a very long time. 
In the context of this study, it would be ideal to establish the governance structures of buffer 
bodies in order to help determine their positional autonomy. This is because in developing 
countries, buffer bodies are reported to be suffering from weaker positional autonomy where 
they are viewed as extensions of the government. By so doing they end up moving towards a 
direction where they serve the government more than HEIs, therefore failing in their role to 
buffer tensions between the two parties. In order to assess positional autonomy, the legislation 
that led to the formation of the buffer body is normally used as it would clearly spell out the 
constituents of governance, the powers conferred upon different positions and the buffer body 
itself. 
The accounting structures of buffer bodies are also very critical to understanding the dynamics 
of the tensions between the roles and functions of buffer bodies. In simple terms, accounting 
structures can be used to denote the routine patterns of reporting for buffer bodies. For buffer 
bodies whose decisions, input and reporting lie with the government, such bodies are likely to 
suffer from a number of tensions since they may be seen to be answerable to the government 
as opposed to playing a fair role of buffering the HEIs from the government (El-Khawas, 1992). 
This is in contrast to a situation where decisions, input and reporting are directed towards HEIs. 
In this case, buffer bodies whose sphere of influence lies with HEIs are also likely to experience 
tensions emanating from failure to lean towards the government. 
The mandate of buffer bodies is also very important in understanding the tensions between the 
different roles and functions of buffer bodies. The debate on the mandate of buffer bodies and 
how they relate to internal and external tensions between roles and functions of buffer and their 
stakeholders centres around a narrow and a wide mandate. As observed in the literature, buffer 
bodies have several functions ranging from quality assurance, long-term planning of higher 
education, coordination and many others (Schmidtlein & Berdhal, 1992). In this case a narrow 
mandate would, for instance, refer to a situation where a buffer body would only be responsible 
for executing one of the functions of buffer bodies as opposed to covering a number of 
functions. In this scenario there are likely to be less internal and external tensions between the 
different roles and functions of a buffer body and its stakeholders (El-Khawas, 1992). On the 
other hand, buffer bodies with a wide mandate may find themselves in a trickier situation as 
they have to traverse an uneasy terrain between government and universities and this has to be 
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done repeatedly increasing the probability of clashes between a buffer body and its 
stakeholders. 
After conceptualising the tensions in roles and functions of buffer bodies, this section provides 
a detailed presentation of the literature on policy formulation, quality assurance and 
coordination of higher education. The focus of the study is to look at the relationship between 
the state, buffer bodies and HEIs with regard to these three functions. 
2.7.1 Policy formulation  
Like any other sector, higher education requires long-term planning, which normally results in 
policy. These policies may differ from country to country and the main question around policy 
is: Who formulates? Who implements? Who monitors and who evaluates? In addition, higher 
education policies are concerned with the affordability of higher education, access to HEIs and 
accountability within the higher education sector.  
Different countries have long-term plans regarding the future direction of higher education. 
The overall responsibility of higher education in most countries lies with the state. Ministries 
responsible for higher education are then entrusted with crafting long-term plans for the sector. 
As Cloete et al. (1996) put it, higher education policy belongs to the government and the 
government sets the priorities for the higher education sector through it. Jonathan (2006), 
arguing that the state possesses the legislative and executive powers to set the direction for 
higher education, shares this view. As a result, the state is responsible for ensuring the adequate 
provision of higher education, to steer development and provide oversight.  
Ministries of education are also supported by buffer bodies acting as advisory councils. The 
role of such bodies is to advise the ministry on issues concerning the development of higher 
education. For example, the Department of Education in South Africa relied heavily on advice 
from NCHE for the formulation of a new policy on higher education (Cloete et al., 1996). In 
addition, the role of buffer bodies in some countries, as already stated, has been extended to 
include implementing government policy as well as implementing funding models for higher 
education.   
2.7.2 Quality assurance 
Quality assurance is defined as a planned and systematic review process of an institution to 
determine whether such an institution meets the set standards of education, scholarships and 
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infrastructure (Materu, 2007; Hayward, 2006). Quality has become an important aspect of 
monitoring and evaluating higher education.  
Quality assurance takes place in different forms such as internal and external evaluations. 
External quality assurance defines those quality assurance procedures that are being 
administered by agencies external to HEIs. Internal quality assurance systems are those systems 
whereby scholarly research, curriculum and examinations are peer reviewed. These kinds of 
systems are very common in different higher education systems as a means of ensuring a 
continuous process of quality.  
The external evaluation of quality in higher education began more than hundred years ago in 
the US (Campbell & Rozsnyai, 2002). This form of evaluation was carried out by non-
governmental organisations and was mandatory for all institutions. It differed from the 
European system based on legislation and government control. With time, European 
governments realised that legislation and government control instruments were not effective in 
dealing with the challenges facing higher education and they saw fit to introduce quasi-non-
governmental organisations that would ensure adherence to quality standards. Some of the 
drivers prompting the introduction of external quality assurance systems, as discussed by 
Campbell and Rozsnyai (2002), include: increased institutional autonomy in return for greater 
accountability; diversification of the student intake; the introduction of new methods of 
teaching and learning; and internationalisation and an increase in the number of private higher 
education providers. 
The development of quality assurance systems in developing countries and particularly in 
Africa has been necessitated by a number of factors, including rapidly growing enrolment 
numbers; growth in private tertiary education institutions; decreased public funding of higher 
education; and the effects of the ‘brain drain’ (Materu, 2007). In Africa, quality assurance was 
first implemented in the form of affiliation by newly set-up local universities to metropolitan 
universities during the colonial era. With time, the first university established would itself 
become a mother university from which other colleges and campuses would eventually gain 
independence and go on to become universities in their own right. After independence, African 
states increased their grip on higher education; however, Materu (2007) argues that this did not 
favour the maintenance or improvement of quality.  
Around the 1980s in Africa, governments set up national quality assurance agencies that aimed 
at ensuring quality in HEIs. These quality assurance agencies were established to ensure that 
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higher education were responsive to the interest of different stakeholders (Tertiary Education 
Council, 2008b). The various stakeholders in higher education have varying interests and 
expectations from HEIs. Despite these varied expectations, they share a common expectation 
relating to the accountability of HEIs and quality programmes in terms of their responsiveness 
to the labour market. The table below illustrates the various uses from external quality 
assurance for different stakeholders in higher education. 
Table 1: Uses of quality assurance for different stakeholders 
Users  Uses 
Government  To define tertiary education country 
wide 
 To assure quality labour force 
 To determine which institutions and 
programmes receive public funding 
 To accept into the civil service only 
those from accredited institutions 
 To generally use quality assurance as a 
means of consumer protection. 
 
Students  To assist in selecting institutions of study 
 To ensure accreditation between 
accredited institutions 
 To ensure articulation and mobility, 
admission at the graduate level at 
different institutions from undergraduate 
degree. 
 
Employers  To ensure qualified employees. 
Funding Organisations  To determine eligible institutions for 
funding. 
Tertiary Education Institutions  To improve institutional information 
data 
 To enhance institutional planning 
 To facilitate membership in certain 
organisations 
 To facilitate transfer schemes 
 To assure a qualified student body. 
Source: Adopted from Tertiary Education Council, 2008b. 
The establishment of national quality assurance agencies has been questioned as some of these 
bodies have been considered too weak to regulate quality in higher education as they are 
controlled by national governments (Materu, 2007). The establishment of these agencies has 
also in some countries created tensions between buffer bodies and the already existing 
arrangements for quality assurance. 
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2.7.3 Coordination of higher education 
The coordination of higher education takes many forms. Martin and Talpert (1992) have 
defined higher education coordination as “the formal system of planning, monitoring, 
allocation of resources, and control whereby governments and bureaucracies regulate higher 
education”. However, in higher education the main focus is on planning and allocation of 
resources. 
The role of coordination as described above is normally performed by either an intermediary 
body such as a buffer organisation or a department within the ministry of education. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, the former UGC was responsible for planning and allocation 
of resources. According to Bekhradnia (2005) this was meant to avoid the possibility of the 
government exerting undue influence on the universities. In this case the UGC was only 
responsible for distributing funds and the government still made decisions on how much 
funding should be allocated to the higher education sector.  
The coordination of higher education involves different stakeholders who range from the 
private sector that comprises multinational organisations and research centres, the government 
comprising different ministries, HEIs, which are both private and public, and lastly, the public, 
made up of students and parents. The overall responsibility of higher education lies with the 
relevant ministry. The ministry oversees higher education as regards compliance with the law, 
ministerial codes and legal statutes, formulation of higher education policy and national 
strategic priorities or development plan. The ministry is able to make informed decisions on 
higher education through support from buffer bodies in the form of national quality assurance 
bodies and a national level advisory body. The national quality assurance bodies are 
responsible for setting quality standards, and conducting evaluations, elaborating and 
implementing policies and standards for improving the quality of higher education. The 
national level advisory bodies are responsible for advising the government on issues related to 
higher education (Eurydice, 2008).  
In addition to these bodies, a national level body comprises executive heads of all public and 
private institutions. This body presents proposals to the government regarding the development 
of higher education and also gives opinion regarding draft laws and other regulatory enactments 
and their role is limited to that. Even though HEIs enjoy a great deal of autonomy in some 
countries, they may be linked to the state through an institutional strategic plan that is 
mandatory for all institutions. Through this plan, institutions enter into performance 
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agreements with the state to provide strategies that specify the objectives of the university 
operations (Eurydice, 2008). In addition to this, HEIs may be also linked to the public and 
private sector through the annual production of mandatory reports, which differ from country 
to country. HEIs may also be required to disseminate their research findings as a way of 
strengthening the relationship between society and institutions. All these provisions are made 
possible through legal instruments such as acts.  
2.8 Conceptual framework 
The foregoing review of literature provides a conceptual framework for this study. As already 
stated, the purpose of the study is to examine the roles, functions and perceived performance 
of the TEC in higher education in Botswana along with the potential tensions that exist between 
the TEC and its related role players in higher education.  
In order to achieve this, the study examines the relationship between the different stakeholders 
involved in the governance of higher education.  Their roles are defined together with the 
relationship that they have with each other. As shown in the literature review, key concepts 
involved in the governance of higher education are autonomy and accountability. These 
concepts are used here to help define the relationship between the different stakeholders 
involved in the governance of higher education.  
The conceptual framework developed for this study is an oversimplification of the complex 
reality involving the governance of higher education through the relationship that exists 
between buffer bodies, the government and HEIs. Therefore it should be treated as a guide or 
lens through which to view the complex relationship between these different components. 
Before discussing the relationship between that exists between the different higher education 
stakeholders, it is important to mention the different modes of governance. This is because the 
relationship between the different stakeholders involved in the governance of higher education 
takes place within the context of the mode of governance employed in a particular country. As 
shown in Figure 3 below, the different modes of higher education governance include the state 
control model, state supervision model and the state interference model. These models have 
been discussed extensively in the literature review section. Depending on the model adopted 
by a higher education system, autonomy and accountability manifest differently within the 
various higher education governance frameworks. Likewise, the relationship between the 
different stakeholders in the governance of HE is also affected by the mode of governance 
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adopted in a particular HE system. The following discussion will focus on the relationship 
between the different stakeholders involved in the governance of higher education. 
Firstly, the framework explains the relationship between a buffer body and the government as 
one of funding, which in most cases the government provides, along with coordination and the 
autonomy of buffer bodies. Reviewed literature shows that funding is an integral part of the 
higher education system. In Africa, governments play an important role in the funding of higher 
education (Teferra & Altbach, 2004: Wangenge-Ouma & Cloete, 2008). The bulk of funding 
for HEIs and buffer bodies comes from governments. Therefore, funding plays an important 
role in shaping and influencing the relationship between buffer bodies and the government. 
Other concepts used to explain the relationship between a buffer body and the government are 
those of autonomy and accountability.  
Figure 3: Higher education governance and the relationship between government and 
higher education institutions 
 
 
Secondly, the conceptual framework captures the relationship between buffer bodies and HEIs. 
This relationship is explained through accreditation and registration of HEIs by buffer bodies, 
allocation of funds and coordination as shown by the conceptual framework. As observed in 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
the literature, buffer bodies may serve one or more functions depending on how they are set 
up.  
Thirdly, the framework depicts the relationship between the government and HEIs. This 
relationship is characterised by the government funding of higher education through 
scholarships and general funding of institutions. In some cases, HEIs are expected to account 
for the way in which they use public funds. In addition, governments also play supervisory and 
regulatory roles. 
The concept of the buffer body forms the core of this study. In the conceptual framework, this 
component of the study is placed between HEIs and the government and labelled as “buffer 
body or agency?” This is very important in helping understand the role of a buffer body as 
discussed in the literature. According to El-Khawas (1992) and De Boer (1992), the role of 
buffer bodies as organisations standing between the government and HEIs is very precarious 
and makes buffer bodies vulnerable. It has been observed that “most buffer organizations 
cannot sustain themselves as neutral parties standing in between the government and higher 
education institutions” (El-Khawas, 1992:18). As a result they either tilt towards the 
government or towards HEIs and in the process defeat the idea of the notion of having a buffer 
body. A situation where a buffer body tilts to either of the two parties can render buffer bodies 
as being agents of either of the two parties, hence the denotation “buffer body or agent?” 
Consequently, different buffer bodies have unique relationships with their stakeholders. It is 
therefore important to investigate these relationships to establish existing tensions between 
buffer bodies and their associated stakeholders. 
2.9 Summary 
As shown above, buffer bodies operate in a challenging environment. A discussion of the 
different concepts related to the study has shown that buffer bodies find themselves in a delicate 
situation where they have to serve different stakeholders with differing expectations. As noted 
by El-Khawas (1992), buffer bodies were created to buffer the tension between the government 
and HEIs. However, the role of buffer bodies has been described as a ‘contradiction’ due to a 
difficult role that they are expected to play (El-Khawas, 1992:19).  
The tensions between the roles and functions of buffer bodies are influenced by aspects of their 
organisational structure, the scope of their agenda and various cultural factors. Buffer bodies, 
as agents of the state and as representatives of the HEIs, find themselves in a position of having 
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to perform their role without disadvantaging either the government or HEIs making it difficult 
to avoid tensions. As a result, in the execution of their mandates, buffer bodies are susceptible 
to clashes with the different stakeholders leading to tensions in their operations. 
The review of literature also reveals that higher education has been undergoing changes in 
terms of governance from state control to state supervision (Maassen & Cloete, 2006). This 
development has not come without cost. For instance, tensions have emerged between different 
stakeholders involved in higher education during this process. Very little has been done to 
assess the tensions between different stakeholders involved in higher education. In cases where 
attempts were made to study tensions between different stakeholders (for example by El-
Khawas, 1992; Kivisto, 2007; and Ahmad et al., 2012), the focus has either been on the 
relationship between HEIs and the government or buffer bodies and the government, 
disregarding the other stakeholders involved.  
Moreover, the review of literature has shown that there is a scarcity of higher education 
literature on tensions between the different roles and functions of buffer bodies in higher 
education, for example, tensions between the policy advice and formulation function, policy 
implementation function like quality assurance, and policy implementation monitoring and 
evaluation function, that may be performed by the same buffer body or by buffer bodies with 
distinct or overlapping mandates. This study makes a contribution to this literature by analysing 
tensions between different selected functions of the TEC of Botswana. There is a need for an 
integrated investigation that will focus on analysing tensions occurring between the main 
stakeholders of higher education (i.e. government, HEIs and buffer bodies) and within buffer 
bodies as far as different functions are concerned. This study has attempted to fill this gap by 
using the TEC as a case study. 
Lastly, the review has provided a set of concepts that are useful to focus this study, develop 
research instruments (as discussed in the following chapter) and guide the analysis of the 
collected data (as provided in Chapter 5). The following chapter discusses and motivates the 
use of a specific research design, research methods and related considerations employed to 
answer the research questions. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines and explains the various methods and techniques used in the collection 
of the data. The study employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. This 
approach has helped enhance the quality of data collected for the study.  The justification for 
the selection and the use of the specific methodologies is given while the issue of research 
ethics is also addressed. 
3.2 Research approach  
The key aspect of this study is to examine the roles, functions and perceived performance of 
the TEC in higher education governance in Botswana by paying particular attention to the three 
functions of the TEC: policy formulation and advisory role, quality assurance, and coordination 
in the planning and development of tertiary education. The potential tensions that exist between 
the TEC, the government and HEIs are also examined.   
The study mostly uses the qualitative approach, complemented with some quantitative data. 
Qualitative research is defined by Creswell (1998:15) as “an inquiry process of understanding 
based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. 
The researcher builds complex, holistic pictures, analyses words, reports detailed views of 
informants, and conducted the study in natural setting”. It allows the researchers to “appreciate 
the uniqueness and complexity of the case, its embeddedness and interaction with its contexts” 
(Stake, 1995:16).  Leedy and Ormrod (2005:235) are of the view that qualitative research 
focuses on phenomena that occurs in natural settings or the real world and are then studied in 
their complexity. It is a flexible research approach allowing for description, interpretation, 
verification and evaluation, although such flexibility makes it challenging for a novice 
researcher (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005:263). Simply put, qualitative research is “… any kind of 
research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means 
of quantification” (Strauss &  Corbin, 1990:17). 
Methods of data collection associated with the qualitative research paradigm include 
observational methods such as semi-structured and unstructured interviewing, participant 
observation and the use of personal and archival documents (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:53). Most 
qualitative research methods complement each other and can be creatively combined in the 
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same study (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005:263). The qualitative approach allowed the participants to 
air their views on the subject under investigation.  
Quantitative research, in contrast, is based on the notion that there is only one truth, an objective 
reality that exists independent of human perception (Sale, Lohfeld & Brazil, 2002). With this 
paradigm the researcher and the subject matter are treated independently such that the 
researcher is not in a position to influence or be influenced by the subject matter. This is 
understood to confer a measure of objectivity on the investigation, which would enable an 
equally competent person to repeat the research and obtain similar results (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994). One of the techniques used to obtain data for this kind of approach includes the use of 
written or orally administered questionnaires. Quantitative strategy was considered an 
appropriate choice for this study in terms of statistical data collection, especially on the HEIs.  
 The study uses a combination of methods, sometimes termed ‘mixed methods’ research. The 
use of mixed methods serves as a source of triangulation where data is gathered using different 
methods to see the convergence of results.  
3.3 Research design 
This study adopted a single case-study design. A case study is defined as “an exploration of a 
bounded system or a case over time through detailed and in-depth data collection involving 
multiple sources of information and in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information rich in context” (Creswell, 1998:272). Similarly, Yin (1989:23) defines a case 
study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which multiple sources of evidence are used. A case study does not rely on any particular 
method of data collection, therefore, any method of data collection can be employed (Merriam, 
1988; Yin, 2007).  
In this study, the TEC was selected as the case under investigation and data gathered from 
multiple sources. Semi-structured interviews were conducted and they involved participants 
from the TEC and the Ministry of Education and Skills Development. A questionnaire was 
administered to the heads of HEIs in Botswana. 
Stake (1994) makes a distinction between three types of case studies: intrinsic, instrumental 
and collective case studies. Intrinsic case studies are used to learn or understand something 
from a particular case or case without aiming explicitly to learn anything beyond the case. 
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Instrumental case studies provide insight into an issue of refining theory whereby the case is 
used to learn about something, for example, theory beyond the case, and collective case studies 
are used to draw thematically from several cases jointly with a focus on the comparison. This 
study is considered to be an intrinsic case as it aims to understand the roles and functions of 
the TEC in higher education governance in Botswana, as well as an instrumental case, in that 
it hopes to contribute to the conceptualisation of buffer bodies in higher education and related 
questions, as the research questions indicate. 
Although case studies have a great potential for theory development, they are not statistically 
generalizable; and it has been shown that many researchers do not even attempt to either relate 
findings to previous theory and research or discuss the theoretical relevance of their study 
(Babbie & Mouton, 2001:283). However, generalisation is not the rationale for qualitative 
research, as each case is preferably understood in context. Rather, a case study design allows 
for an in-depth investigation within context and thus leads to a clearer understanding of the 
organisation. Generalisation in the sense of transferability of understanding from one context 
and case to another is, however, possible. Moreover, analytical generalisation from the case to 
new concepts and theory is also possible. This study reflects on the general, the empirical and 
theoretical contributions arising from the case study in the final chapter.  
3.3.1 Case selection 
As already stated, the unit under study was the TEC in Botswana. Selection of the TEC as a 
case was primarily purposive and based on the many functions that the TEC performs in 
comparison to other similar bodies. Comparable bodies, especially in terms of the mandate and 
functions, have separated some of their functions, for example, regulatory functions have been 
separated from quality assurance functions, by establishing different agencies for each of these 
functions (Tertiary Education Council, 2008a). However, in Botswana, the TEC mandate 
covers both regulatory and quality assurance functions including funding of HEIs. 
Furthermore, the TEC is the only body that deals with universities and colleges of higher 
education. It is upon this basis and the variation in models used by the TEC that the researcher 
selected the TEC as a case under investigation.  
The other reason for undertaking research in this area is because the researcher, being a former 
employee of the TEC, already had some foreknowledge about the organisation, which helped 
in facilitating the data collection process. 
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3.4 Data collection  
This study was designed in a way that could allow for the use of multiple sources of evidence. 
The findings were based on three sources of data: semi-structured interviews with directors 
from the TEC, a survey questionnaire that targeted higher education institutional heads and a 
review of policy documents, which were used as secondary data sources. A brief description 
of the data collection process is presented below. 
3.4.1 Interviews 
Qualitative interviewing is described as “conversations in which the researcher gently guides 
a conversational partner in an extended discussion” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005:4). The researcher 
has a general plan of inquiry using basic individual, deep individual or focus group 
interviewing, but not a specific set of questions that must be asked in particular words in a 
particular order (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). The researcher should take caution to frame 
questions in a way that minimises bias in responses and to avoid slipping into a normal 
conversation. The reason for selecting this interview method was that the researcher believed 
a variety of people would provide insights regarding the roles and functions of the TEC in 
higher education governance in Botswana. 
The interviews were conducted in two phases. The first phase, conducted in September 2011 
by the researcher, focused on the performance of the TEC in relation to the selected functions. 
It entailed semi-structured interviews with key informants. The key informants included three 
participants from the TEC; a senior staff member from the policy and planning directorate, a 
senior staff member from the quality assurance directorate, and a senior staff member from the 
executive secretary’s office. These key informants were considered knowledgeable about the 
issue under investigation because of the wealth of their experience in their respective 
directorates. The researcher also interviewed the two former directors of policy planning and 
quality assurance to get their views on the performance of the TEC. They were considered the 
most relevant sources of knowledge given the wealth of their experience. The interview guides 
used for this set of interviews are provided in appendices H-J. 
The second phase of interviews was done in April 2012 by a research team that included the 
researcher, which was part of a project of the Higher Education Research Advocacy Network 
in Africa (HERANA) undertaken by the Centre for Higher Education and Transformation 
(CHET) in Cape Town, South Africa. The purpose of the HERANA project was to develop a 
better understanding of the national higher education councils/commissions and their possible 
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role in policy coordination in various African countries. The researcher was part of the team 
that collected data for the Botswana case study. Data collected was deemed relevant to this 
study, hence its use.  
As part of the HERANA project, key personnel at the MoESD and key personnel from the TEC 
were re-interviewed. The respondents were sampled purposefully due to their knowledge, 
expertise and experience related to the issue under investigation. A total of six respondents 
were interviewed. These interviews covered issues such as the perceptions and opinions about 
the autonomy, accountability and the overall governance of higher education in Botswana, the 
role and functions of the TEC including policy formulation, quality assurance and coordination 
(see appendices C-E) and funding of higher education in the Botswana. 
With reference to the first phase of interviews, the researcher sent email invitations to each of 
the selected participants requesting them to take part in the study. Once a positive response was 
received, the researcher sent another email to request an interview on a specific date, time and 
place suitable to the participants. All interviews took place in the participants’ places of work. 
The participants were briefed on the purpose of the study and the procedures prior to the 
interview (see appendix G). An interview guideline was customised to the function of the 
officials and used during the interviews (appendices H-J). The interviews ranged between 60-
90 minutes depending on the respondent’s level of engagement on the subject being discussed. 
All interviews were recorded using an audio tape following consent given from the respondents 
(see information and consent form in appendix G). The researcher took notes as the interview 
progressed especially if respondents refused to be tape recorded. Transcription of interviews 
was carried out by the researcher. 
The same procedure was followed on the second phase of interviews, which were conducted 
in April 2012. The interviews were later transcribed with the help of a transcription service 
provider. A copy of the interview transcripts was given to the researcher and later used in data 
analysis together with the notes that were taken during the interviews.   
3.4.2 Survey questionnaire 
In addition to the interviews, the researcher chose to conduct a highly targeted survey among 
key role players in Botswana’s higher education system. By using the surveying method, the 
researcher was able to reach the target population within a short period and within a limited 
budget. In particular, this method targeted the heads of all 32 HEIs in Botswana registered with 
the TEC during the time of data collection, which took place in September 2011. Thus, the 
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sampling method employed for the survey was purposive and involved an actual ‘census’ 
targeting all the heads of HEIs in Botswana. 
The questionnaire contained 33 statements to rate in terms of the five-point Likert scale: 
strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree, and a provision 
for don’t know/refuse to answer (see appendix L). The reason for choosing the Likert scale is 
that it is easier to use and understand for both researcher and respondent. Additional space was 
provided to give respondents more leeway in terms of providing additional information and 
comments.  
Prior to distributing the questionnaires, the researcher sent email letters to the 32 higher 
education institutional heads (see appendix A). Follow-up calls were made to the HEIs that had 
not responded to the email. The survey was sent via email and some were faxed to the 
institutions that indicated they did not receive the email for whatever reason. In some cases, 
second rounds of emails were sent to the participants. The participants were requested to return 
the questionnaires within a month. A consent form containing all information for the 
participants was attached on the front page of the questionnaire (see appendix L). 
The researcher primarily received completed surveys through email, but a few of the responses 
were received via post. A total of 24 questionnaires were received. The return of 24 
questionnaires meant a response rate of 75%. The response rate is therefore satisfactory in 
terms of a reasonable representation.  Although attempts were made to increase the response 
rate, there were some participants, for example, UB, considered important to the study, but who 
did not respond to the questionnaire and their non-response affected the study. Their response 
would have enriched the findings of the study and also provided a better understanding of the 
role of the TEC in higher education, especially on the quality assurance function.  
3.4.3 Document review 
Document review is one of the three research techniques adopted by the researcher in this 
study. “Many documents are easily accessible, free and contain information that would take an 
investigator enormous time and effort to gather otherwise,” states Merriam (1998:125). A 
number of documents were reviewed to have a better understanding of the issues under study. 
These included policy documents, legal texts, reports, strategic plans, organisational profiles 
and newsletters. These documents were used to uncover information regarding the roles and 
functions of the TEC in higher education, particularly quality assurance issues. The following 
is a list of such documents:  
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 Tertiary Education Policy of 2008 
 Tertiary Education Act of 1999 
 National Human Resource Development Strategy 1999 
 Revised national policy on education 1994.  
An extended list of documents can be found in appendix F. The researcher was cognisant of 
the fact that documents are not completely objective since they are written from the author’s 
perspective. Nevertheless, documentary information, according to Yin (2009) is more than 
likely to be relevant to every case study topic and useful for augmenting evidence from other 
sources. This method assisted in enriching the results obtained from the survey and interviews. 
3.5 Data analysis 
According to Stake (1995:71) ,“there is no particular moment when data analysis begins. 
Analysis is a matter of giving meaning to first impressions as well as to final compilations”.  
The purpose of data analysis is to explain concepts in a simplified manner and to indicate 
clearly the relationship between variables. According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998), resultant 
interpretations from the study are assessed in terms of criteria, from the positivist tradition 
including validity, reliability and objectivity and those that stand up to scrutiny are then put 
forward as the findings of the study.  
Data analysis for this study was divided into three broad areas: (1) interviews obtained through 
semi-structured interviews; (2) survey obtained through questionnaire; and (3) documentary 
analysis. 
For the purpose of conducting a quantitative analysis of survey responses, the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used. According to Bryman and Cramer (1994), SPSS 
is the most used and the most comprehensive statistical programme in the social sciences. 
Quantitative data was manipulated in several stages using SPSS and Microsoft Excel. The 
stages included: data coding, data entry, data cleaning, descriptive statistical analysis, the 
presentation of data and, finally, data interpretation. Descriptive tools such as tables and graphs 
were used in the analysis and interpretation of data. These are presented in chapter 4. 
The qualitative data from the key informant interviews was supported by the survey data in the 
sense that the survey data verified the qualitative data, especially in that it has different 
respondents than the interviews. The first phase of interviews entailed the researcher 
transcribing raw data, which involves listening to recorded interviews and converting them into 
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text. Transcription helped the researcher become more familiar with the data. After interview 
transcription, the data was sub-divided and assigned categories in the form of tags or labels. 
This process, known as coding, was done to assign units of meaning for the descriptive data 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Once coding was done, data was categorised into themes. Direct 
citations were also used to underscore certain positions. 
3.6 Trustworthiness 
The study adopted the triangulation method in order to ensure the trustworthiness of the 
research findings. As mentioned above, data collection for this study involved using a 
combination of several methods. The multiple sources of data were used in order to develop 
‘converging lines of inquiry’ (Yin, 2009:115). The data collected by means of different 
methods enabled the researcher to view the evidence from different angles and aimed to 
‘corroborate’ the findings of the study (Yin, 2009:116). Yin (2003) argues that no single 
method has a comparative advantage over the other; rather, the use of different methods is seen 
as highly complementary.  
The rationale for triangulation is that it enables validation of results obtained from research 
(Modell, 2005); that is rather than the results reflecting the character of a particular method, 
they rightfully reflect the character of the trait being investigated (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
Smith (1991) emphasises the importance of triangulation in the following statement: 
Triangulation evokes means of measuring and mapping some area 
through knowledge of several pieces of information. Because each 
method has a unique informational strength and weaknesses, researchers 
should use a combination of methods, with the intent of counterbalancing 
the merits and demerits of each method. Multiple methods aid reliability 
and validity, through providing a corrective for irrelevant components of 
any measurement procedure (1999:512). 
The combination of different methods is seen as a strategy that adds rigour, complexity, 
richness and depth to any inquiry (Yin, 2003). Using multiple methods in a study helps a 
researcher overcome intrinsic biases and other problems emanating from the use of a single 
method.  
3.7 Ethical considerations 
When conducting research, one needs to be guided by the ethics associated with it. According 
to Oppenheim (1996:83), “the basic ethical principle is that no harm should come to the 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
respondents as a result of their participation in the research”. Following this assertion, the 
researcher made maximum efforts to ensure adherence to the necessary ethical standards. 
Firstly, the research proposal along with all data collection tools were presented to and 
approved by the University of the Western Cape’s Senate Research Committee before data 
collection. The process of data collection commenced immediately upon approval of the 
research proposal and instruments. Secondly, approval and informed consent were sought from 
the participants and relevant institutions. This was to ensure that no harm was done to the study 
participants (Babbie & Mouton, 2001).  
The respondents were presented with a consent form and a brief introduction to the study (see 
appendix A). This enabled them to make informed decisions when consenting to the study. All 
participants remained anonymous throughout the analysis of the data (Creswell, 2009). 
Confidentiality and anonymity were maintained throughout and all participants were advised 
of this. The researcher removed any details that might be harmful to the participants. The 
participants were however cautioned that their words could be quoted in the final report, but 
that their names would not be used in conjunction with the quotation. However, as study 
participants would be identified by the role they play in Botswana higher education, for 
example as TEC directors, an informed reader might be able to guess their identity. The 
participants have been alerted to this as part of the process of informing about the study and 
requesting their consent to participate. 
Lastly, in the case of interviews, caution was taken by refraining from asking questions that 
could cause discomfort to the interviewees. The use of electronic recording devices was 
divulged to the participants before the interviewees. The interview transcripts along with the 
questionnaire data were securely stored in a password-protected computer file and will only be 
destroyed after a period of five years from the time the study is complete. 
3.8 Limitations of the study 
The researcher has worked at the TEC for a period of four years. For this reason, there is a 
possibility that the participants’ responses may have been affected. The researcher may also 
have personal biases that may affect data analysis and interpretation (Onwuegbuzie, 2002).   
This study dealt with the TEC as a single case only, but the study could be extended to cover 
other bodies comparable to the TEC. In particular, the study could have included the two other 
units that are to be merged with the TEC. The significance of such a study could cover the 
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diverse practices and political context as well as cut across other bodies that have not been 
covered in this study. Despite the exclusion of other bodies, the scope of the study was 
sufficient to tease out the issues that the study set out to investigate as stated in the objectives 
of the study. 
However, having identified the limitations, every effort has been made to ensure that the 
findings of the study are valid. The instruments used for data collection were checked by the 
supervisory team to ensure the addressed the study’s objectives. More importantly, the research 
proposal was subjected to scrutiny by the senate and was approved. As such the proposal was 
found to be within the ambit of research ethics as set by the University of the Western Cape. 
This helped to eliminate any personal bias and helped ensure the credibility of the study’s 
findings. 
This chapter has discussed the methodology that this study followed. It has addressed the 
various methods and techniques that assisted the collection of data required by the study. The 
justification for the selection and use of specific methodologies has been made. The issue of 
research ethics has also been addressed. The chapter concludes with a brief note on the 
limitations of the study. The following chapter is therefore devoted towards data analysis and 
discussion of the key research findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
4.1 Introduction 
As outlined in the previous chapters, the purpose of this study was to examine the roles, 
functions and perceived performance of the TEC in the governance of higher education in 
Botswana along with the potential tensions that exist between the TEC and its primary 
stakeholders. The chapter therefore focuses on the presentation and analysis of data collected 
from the interviews, documents and survey. It attempts a discussion between the research 
findings, objectives of the study and the literature review.  
4.2 Higher education in Botswana: context and role players 
This section contextualises the research conducted on the TEC in Botswana. It includes a brief 
background overview of Botswana and description of its higher education system, followed by 
a preliminary overview and discussion of the key role players in Botswana’s higher education 
and the tensions between the roles and functions of the TEC and between the government, the 
TEC and HEIs. 
4.2.1 The Republic of Botswana 
Botswana is a landlocked country located in the southern part of Africa with a population of 
about 2.06 million people. Botswana, known as Bechuanaland before it gained independence 
in 1966, is bordered by Namibia to the west, Zambia to the north, Zimbabwe to the north east 
and South Africa to the south.  It was a British Protectorate from 1885 until independence in 
1966.  
4.2.2 Higher education system in Botswana 
In Botswana, higher education, otherwise known as tertiary education, is defined in the Tertiary 
Education Act of 1999 as “all post-secondary education and training” (Tertiary Education Act, 
1999). Within the framework of the Tertiary Education Policy, tertiary education is understood 
to mean “all formal education programmes beyond the level of senior secondary embracing 
technical and occupation specific programmes and those with a strong theoretical foundation 
through to advanced research qualifications” (Government of Botswana, 2008:16). 
Botswana had no HEIs of their own prior to independence in 1966. The only institution that 
existing prior to independence was the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, 
which was established in 1964 and funded by the Ford Foundation and the British government. 
Upon attainment of independence in 1966, the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
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(UBLS) was established and equally funded by the governments of the three countries. In 1975 
the Government of Lesotho withdrew from the regional university and nationalised its share of 
the UBLS and, as a result, Botswana and Swaziland developed a joint university. In 1982, the 
partnership between the University of Botswana and Swaziland ended because the two 
countries realised that in the long term the two university colleges would develop into 
independent national universities. The University of Botswana (UB) was then established 
through an Act of Parliament (Mokgwathi, 1992).   
UB was the only university in the country until 2007 when five private HEIs were registered 
by the TEC, starting a new chapter in the higher education system of Botswana. The current 
landscape of HEIs in Botswana comprises 26 publicly funded tertiary education institutions 
(universities, colleges of education, institutes of health sciences and other tertiary education 
institutions), and 13 privately funded tertiary education institutions, as shown in the table below 
(Tertiary Education Council, 2013). 
Table 2: Overview of higher education in Botswana, 2013 
Type of higher education institution Number of institutions 
Public institutions 26 
Private institutions 13 
Total 39 
Source: Tertiary Education Council, 2013. Also see Appendix (K) for a list of all higher education institutions in Botswana. 
4.2.3 Key role players in Botswana’s tertiary education system 
There are a number of key players involved in the higher education system of Botswana. Each 
of them plays a different but significant role. These key role players include the government, 
students, parents, the private sector, the TEC, HEIs, and different government ministries such 
as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. Despite the many stakeholders involved 
in higher education, this study only focuses on the relationship between the government, the 
TEC and HEIs. This is mainly because of the existing gap in the literature on the tensions 
between the roles and functions of buffer bodies, government and HEIs. 
4.2.3.1 The changing role of government  
The higher education landscape has experienced significant reforms over the years. One of the 
changes with a bearing on the higher education sector is the changing role of the state, which 
has been redefined to move away from direct control towards supervision and oversight 
(Tertiary Education Council, 2005). By so doing, buffer bodies or agents in some cases have 
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been introduced to assume some of the roles previously carried out by the government. 
However, the transition of the role of the government from direct control to state supervision 
and oversight has not been a smooth one. In the process, the relationship between the 
government, buffer bodies or agents and the HEIs has been characterised by tensions. In this 
section, the changing role of the state in Botswana’s higher education system and the inherent 
tensions will be discussed.  
The history of higher education in Botswana has shown that the higher education system has 
undergone significant reforms in terms of governance structure. As in other countries, the role 
of the state has shifted from that of direct-control to state supervision and oversight, as will be 
discussed further in subsequent sections (Tertiary Education Council, 2005). Through the 
recommendations of the Revised National Policy on Education (Government of Botswana, 
1994), a statutory TEC was established in 1999. 
The introduction of the TEC meant that some of the roles traditionally carried out directly by 
the government were transferred to the statutory body. The transformation of the tertiary 
education sector in this regard has brought about changes in the different functions of the TEC 
and that of the government. By relinquishing some of its roles, the government’s role in higher 
education has had to be redefined. Its relationship with the different stakeholders has been 
redefined together with the roles it is expected to perform. Bjarnason and Lund (1999:17) 
describe the role of the government in the higher education sector as follows: 
The role of Government in the [higher] education sector is twofold. 
Firstly, it provides overall planning direction, supervision and general 
guidance though curriculum development, certification and regulation of 
all educational activities. The second major role is provision of education 
and training across the whole spectrum of the education system. This 
provision is mainly in the form of direct financing of educational 
institutions under the Ministry of Education or grants to various non-
governmental organisations. Government also provides loans and grants 
to students attending tertiary institutions both in Botswana and outside 
the country. 
Currently, the government through the Ministry of Education and Skills Development 
(MoESD) is entrusted with regulating and funding higher education with some of the regulating 
function transferred to the TEC. Since independence, the Government of Botswana has 
consistently invested one percent of its gross domestic product in higher education. This 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
represents a significant commitment, which is high by international comparison (UNESCO, 
2007).  
4.2.3.2 The governance structure of tertiary education institutions in Botswana 
As mentioned above, HEIs in Botswana can be separated into two groups: public HEIs and 
private HEIs. Firstly, there are public institutions that continue to be fully funded by the state. 
These include health institutions, colleges of education and technical training colleges. These 
tertiary education institutions are governed by different government ministries and managed 
on the same basis as other government departments, thus the colleges of education fall under 
the Ministry of Education and Skills Development, the Botswana College of Agriculture under 
the Ministry of Agriculture and institutes of health sciences under the Ministry of Health. The 
management of these institutions is limited to the day-to-day activities, which include, among 
other things, the execution of the learning process and internal running of the institutions. All 
employees of public HEIs are government employees and are hired by the Department of 
Public Service Management.  
In addition, there are two public universities: UB and Botswana International University of 
Science and Technology (BIUST)2, which are regulated under separate acts and therefore enjoy 
a relatively high degree of autonomy under the governance of their own councils and board of 
directors. Their councils comprise different representatives from the private sector, 
government, university management, representatives from staff unions (academic and non-
academic) and the Student Representative Council (SRC). Although these universities are 
funded by the government, they make independent decisions through their councils. These 
institutions are headed by the President of Botswana as the Chancellor. However, a looser 
coupling to the government has been signalled symbolically in that the sitting president, who 
is by default the chancellor of these universities, has instead nominated different chancellors 
for both UB and BIUST (Kotecha, 1999). UB has a relationship with the public higher 
education colleges and institutes through a complex institutional affiliation arrangement. Under 
this arrangement, the colleges of education are quality assured by UB and are required to meet 
the university’s standards. Their graduates use the UB approved seal in their certificates and, 
as such, they are expected to meet UB standards. 
                                                          
2 Note: Botswana International University of Science and Technology is the country’s second university and it is 
funded under a public-private partnership, but with a relatively large proportion of capital development 
coming from the government. 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Given the direct involvement of various ministries in the governance and management of public 
higher education colleges and institutes, along with the special status of UB and BIUST, the 
TEC argued in its 2006 landmark policy report, Towards a Knowledge Society: A proposal for 
a Tertiary Education Policy for Botswana, that:  
The result of this overall governance model is fragmentation with tertiary 
education institutions subject to direction and control from disparate 
agencies resulting in an absence of system coherence and a consequent 
lack of system level strategic direction. (Tertiary Education Council, 
2006:44)  
Secondly, there are the private HEIs. They are independent from the government with complete 
decision autonomy.  Most of these private institutions adopt a business-like management 
structure, where the head of the institution is called the managing director. The Government of 
Botswana sponsors its citizens in the private HEIs through loans. The role of the private 
institutions has been limited to the provision of technical and vocational training, where the 
private sector continues to play an important role (Ramatsui et al., 2008:33). Most of these 
private HEIs offer franchised programmes from various institutions. 
4.2.3.3 Other role players 
There are other role players involved in higher education governance besides the government 
and HEIs. These include the private sector, students and parents. Currently, the role of the 
private sector is restricted to participation in policy initiatives and representation in institutional 
boards/councils. The different stakeholders responsible for managing higher education meet 
regularly to discuss issues affecting higher education in the country. With the implementation 
of the Tertiary Education Policy (2008), the private sector is expected to play a significant role 
in tertiary education through funding and working closely with institutions to enhance the skills 
of the graduate students (Tertiary Education Council, 2008a) 
Students also play a role in higher education, albeit a role limited primarily to the institutional 
level where they participate in matters related to their welfare through the SRCs. Moreover, a 
student representative is part of the TEC council (see below). Parents have no formal role in 
higher education governance in Botswana, although they do play a role by funding their 
children to attend HEIs.  
The Tertiary Education Council was established as a statutory organisation to play various roles 
and execute a diverse range of functions. The remainder of this chapter analyses in detail the 
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data collected pursuant to the research questions of this study; namely (1) How do different 
stakeholders conceive of the role of the TEC in higher education? (2)What are the potential 
tensions that exist between the TEC, government and HEIs in terms of the roles and functions 
of the TEC? (3) What is the perceived impact of these likely tensions on the performance of 
the TEC in relation to the three functions: policy formulation and advisory role, quality 
assurance and coordination in the planning and development of tertiary education? 
4.3 The Tertiary Education Council: Establishment, statutory functions and organisation 
The TEC is defined as an autonomous body established under the Tertiary Education Act, Cap 
57:04 of 1999 (Government of Botswana, 1999). However, the origin of the TEC dates back 
to the Report of the National Commission on Education in 1993 (paragraph 7.5.29), which 
recommended that such a body be established (Government of Botswana, 1993). This 
recommendation was endorsed by the Government in the Revised National Policy on 
Education (RNPE), passed by the Parliament in 1994. In 1999, tertiary education legislation 
was enacted to bring the TEC into being. The Tertiary Education Act of 1999 gave statutory 
backing to the creation of the TEC as a body responsible for “… promotion and coordination 
of tertiary education and for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, 
examination and research in tertiary institutions” (Section 5 (1).  
Although the recommendation that led to the establishment of the TEC was endorsed by the 
government in 1994, it took 10 years for the TEC to start operating. The main reason advanced 
for this delay is the slow bureaucratic nature of government processes. However the delayed 
establishment of the TEC may also indicate tensions between the different stakeholders 
involved in higher education. For example, one of the reasons mentioned by study participants 
for the delay was the already well-established structure in place catering for some of the 
responsibilities that the TEC was to undertake. This was in the form of government institutions 
and the Botswana College of Agriculture affiliating to UB. Therefore the establishment of the 
TEC seemed to create tensions between these different stakeholders. This will be dealt with in 
detail below. 
The TEC is governed by a council consisting of the chairperson, the executive secretary, 
council members drawn from government, the private sector, labour, tertiary institutions, the 
academic community, students and a representative from the wider community (Tertiary 
Education Council, 2012). The council comprises 14 non-executives and the executive 
secretary who are all appointed by the Minister of Education and Skills Development. The 
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council is responsible for setting the direction of the TEC in line with the Tertiary Education 
Act of 1999. 
The statutory functions of the TEC are varied and include the following (Government of 
Botswana, 1999:4): 
(1) Formulating policy on tertiary education and advising government accordingly. 
(2) Coordinating the long-term planning and overall development of tertiary education. 
(3) Planning for the funding of tertiary education research including the recurrent and 
development needs of public tertiary institutions. 
(4) Receiving and approving applications from persons seeking to establish private tertiary 
institutions. 
(5) Promoting coordination among tertiary institutions. 
(6) Reviewing and approving programmes of study in respect of private tertiary institutions. 
(7) Ensuring that quality assurance procedures are in place at all tertiary institutions. 
(8) Ensuring the audit of physical facilities and the assessment of their adequacy in tertiary 
institutions. 
(9) Accrediting private tertiary institutions. 
The different functions are organisationally clustered in the Executive Secretary’s Office and 
in the directorates of the TEC. The directorates are as follows: policy and planning, quality 
assurance and regulation, corporate services, institutional funding, and knowledge 
management. The head of the TEC is the Executive Secretary whose role is to spearhead the 
mandate of the TEC and report to the council. Each directorate is respectively headed by a 
director. Overall, the TEC has a staff compliment of about 45. An organogram of the TEC is 
provided in the figure below.  
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Figure 4: Organisational structure of the Tertiary Education Council 
Source: TEC, 2010a.      
The five directorates are responsible for different functions: (1) the directorate of policy and 
planning is responsible for research, policy and for strategic planning and  development of 
tertiary education; (2) the quality assurance and regulation directorate oversees registration of 
all tertiary education institutions, accreditation of programmes in private tertiary education 
institutions and  carries out institutional audits in public tertiary education institutions, as well 
as being responsible for quality assurance in all tertiary education institutions; (3) the 
directorate of institutional funding advises the government on financial needs of the public 
tertiary education institutions; (4) corporate services directorate oversees the activities internal 
to the TEC; and lastly, (5) the knowledge management directorate is responsible for supporting 
the work of the TEC in terms of information technology, communications and marketing and 
data management. 
The discussion above has shown that it took 10 years for the TEC to start operating after the 
first proposal to establish the TEC by the Report of the National Commission on Education in 
1993. After starting operations, in less than 10 years, recommendations from the Tertiary 
Education Policy of 2008 were made to dissolve the TEC to form a new organisation in the 
form of the Human Resources Development Council. The rationale for the recommendation to 
dissolve the TEC emerged from the weaknesses identified in the existing government and 
support agencies such as BOTA, the TEC and MPU. According to the Government of 
Botswana (2009), the existing agencies are characterised by fragmentation, duplication and 
overlapping mandates. 
In an endeavour to fulfil its mandate, the TEC was faced with challenges relating to tensions 
between its diverse roles and functions and between its various stakeholders. Available 
literature on the TEC has not yet focused on ascertaining the tensions between its roles and 
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functions and its stakeholder environment. Hence the following sections will focus on the 
tensions between the roles and functions of the TEC and its stakeholders.  
4.3.1 Conceptualising the TEC as a buffer body  
As highlighted in the literature review section, the concept of the buffer body came into being 
following the realisation that there was a need for a body to advise the government and give 
those operating within the sector the confidence that their affairs were being managed by 
people who understood their culture and concerns (Fielden, 2000). Some of the terminologies 
used in the literature to describe these organisations include intermediary bodies or agencies. 
Although there may be different terms loosely used to describe buffer bodies, de Rudder 
(1992:50) warns that not all of the terms fit align with the commonly understood definition. De 
Boer (1992:36) defines a buffer body as a “formally constituted organisation standing between 
the government and the institutions for higher education”.  
In this section, a conceptualisation of TEC will be carried out to help define TEC as either a 
buffer body or an agent of government. As already mentioned above, the TEC was established 
under the Tertiary Education Act 1999 to act as a buffer body for the higher education sector. 
In this section, more emphasis will be placed on describing the roles and functions that make 
the TEC a buffer body and conceptualising the TEC as a buffer body. Firstly, the roles and 
functions of TEC as a buffer body will be described. This is followed by a description of the 
different stakeholder perceptions on TEC’s role as a buffer body.   
The TEC has been mandated with a number of roles and functions, but not all of them are 
buffer roles/functions. One of the functions where the TEC acts as a buffer body is that of 
quality assurance. In the case of quality assurance the government and HEIs do not deal directly 
with each other; instead the TEC has been tasked with the role of ensuring quality in HEIs. 
However, this role is limited to private HEIs and not public institutions. With this function, the 
TEC is responsible for ensuring that HEIs offering higher education in the country meet set 
quality standards. This function was realised after the number of private HEIs increased from 
one institution in 1966 to nine institutions in 2013. The quality assurance function involves, 
among other things (Tertiary Education Council, 2008b:5): 
1) Receiving and approving applications from persons seeking to establish private tertiary 
education institutions. 
2) Reviewing and approving programmes of study in respect of private tertiary institutions. 
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3) Ensuring the auditing and adequacy of physical facilities in private tertiary institutions. 
4)  Accrediting private tertiary institutions. 
5) Ensuring that quality assurance procedures are in place in all private tertiary institutions.  
This function requires that all private HEIs interested in offering academic programmes from 
diploma level up to PhD level register with the TEC. Accreditation involves two processes. 
The first process requires that all new private HEIs that do not meet the set standards be given 
a letter of interim authority. The letter of interim authority is meant to afford institutions enough 
time to be able to prepare to meet the set standards (Tertiary Education Council, 2013). After 
a given period (three years after registration or one year of operation) the institutions would 
then go through the process of accreditation as outlined further below. 
The second process involves institutions already in operation. For these institutions a set of 
regulations (regulations for operating private and public institutions) was developed to help 
register these institutions and guide their operation. The regulations for operating public and 
private institutions are meant for already existing public and private HEIs. After registration, 
the institutions undergo an accreditation process. Under this process, institutions prepare a self-
study report for submission to the TEC using the regulations provided. The accreditation 
procedure as stipulated on the TEC website is as follows (Tertiary Education Council, 2013): 
1. An institution is supposed to submit a self-study report and the programme content of 
programmes to be accredited. 
2. The self-study report is evaluated by the Tertiary Education Council through 
independent assessors. 
3. The Council thereafter convenes a team of independent assessors of subject matter 
experts on the programme to be accredited. 
4. The assessors would then produce a report which will be forwarded to the Academic 
Planning and Development Committee (APDC) for consideration. The APDC will 
then make a recommendation to the council; the council in its meeting also considers 
the recommendation and asks the Minister to make a decision on whether to accredit 
or not accredit the programme. In this regard TEC plays an advisory role in the 
accreditation process. 
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The registration process commenced in 2006 and to date the TEC has registered 39 public and 
private HEIs. 
Another function where the TEC is expected to perform its role as a buffer body is that of 
funding. This function is captured under sections 5(2)(a) and 9(a) of the Tertiary Education Act 
of 1999. Section 5(2)(a) stipulates that TEC should plan for the funding of higher education 
research, and the recurrent and development needs of tertiary institutions. Subsection (e) states 
that the TEC shall receive and review budgets for tertiary institutions. Section 9 (a) requires 
that the Executive Secretary of the TEC develop resource allocation and utilisation models and 
also coordinate the preparation of annual budgets for public institutions.  However this function 
has not been fully executed as there are a number of formalities still to be concluded and key 
among those formalities is the development of a funding model for HEIs. At the moment the 
development of the funding model is at an advanced stage and is awaiting approval by 
parliament.  
The TEC is also mandated with the function of coordinating higher education in the country 
and in this sense performs a buffer role. Through this function the TEC is expected to 
coordinate long term planning and overall development of higher education, as well as 
promoting coordination among HEIs.  
As observed in the literature, different people have different understandings about what 
constitutes a buffer body (De Boer, 1992).  The term buffer body is used in literature to refer 
to an organisation standing between the government and the institutions (De Boer, 1992). 
However, this definition does not distinguish between buffer bodies and other bodies, such as 
agents, which also act as intermediaries between the government, HEIs and the public. 
Bekhradnia (2006) uses two sets of criteria to distinguish between buffer bodies and those with 
similar roles or functions.  
The first criterion concerns the legal status of buffer bodies. When compared to other bodies 
like government agents, buffer bodies are organisations created by legislation with their powers 
and responsibilities clearly spelt. This helps buffer bodies secure their independence from the 
government. Fielden (2008) argues that it is this independence that helps them protect the 
interests of academic affairs and institutional autonomy.  
The second criterion involves the functions that are carried out by buffer bodies. The functions 
of buffer bodies include quality assurance, academic programme review, policy analysis, 
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strategic planning, budget development/funding advice/allocation, programme administration, 
monitoring and accountability, and deciding on enrolment figures (El-Khawas, 1992). 
 It is these set of criteria that will be used as a yardstick against which the notion of buffer body 
as understood by different role players in the Botswana higher education system will be 
measured. In order to assess the conceptualisation of the TEC as a buffer body, officials from 
the TEC and the government were interviewed. According to a TEC official, the TEC acts as 
a buffer and ‘middleman’ between the government, HEIs and other key stakeholders. The 
excerpt below captures this official’s understanding of the TEC as a buffer body:  
Actually buffer bodies around the country are like process offices … we 
are buffering the key stakeholders … we are in between. The institutions 
cannot go direct to the government on matters of higher education, they 
have to go through TEC then we take the advice as a whole to the 
Minister. The ministry may have an intervention, it has to go 
procedurally according to protocol, they have to go through the TEC. 
TEC should be the one that takes that pronouncement to the institutions. 
(Interview with TEC official, April 25, 2012). 
The views expressed in the above excerpt were reinforced by another TEC 
official as reflected in the following excerpt: 
We are buffering the key tertiary education stakeholders – we have 
parents, we have students, we have the community, we have the private 
sector – you name it, and then there is government. We are in between. 
(Interview with TEC official, April 25, 2012). 
From the perspective of the government, one respondent echoed the views of a TEC official by 
saying that the TEC provides a ‘bridge’ between the government and the private HEIs. These 
words were captured from a MoESD official who had this to say: 
I would say it has been a nice bridge between government and the private 
sector … in terms of quality assurance, TEC is still not able to have a 
hand over what happens at the University of Botswana … but, of course, 
we need to understand that government will not always like to easily give 
away control - particularly with strategic institutions. But I would say 
yes, for the private sector, that buffer seems to be working, but not 
necessarily in terms of the public institutions. (Interview with MoESD 
official, April 25, 2012). 
The views cited reveal some interesting issues surrounding the conception of the TEC as a 
buffer body. The use of metaphors “process offices” and “nice bridge” reflect the buffer role 
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that the TEC plays. As “process offices” or “nice bridge,” the TEC ensures that private 
institutions offer quality education to the society. The government does not have to deal directly 
with these institutions; instead, the institutions are registered and accredited by the TEC. In this 
instance, the TEC is playing the role of a buffer body and this view is shared by all the 
stakeholders. However it has to be noted that the TEC is not at liberty to carry out its mandate 
without any influence from the government. As evidenced by excerpts from interviews with 
government officials, the government is not always willing to give away control particularly 
with strategic institutions. The fact that the government may not be willing to give away the 
control of public HEIs may have implications on the TEC’s role in coordinating higher 
education. This has the potential to bring about tensions between the roles and functions of the 
TEC, as will be discussed later. 
The respondent affirmed, when asked, that the TEC also protected the ministry. The interview 
therefore supports the argument in the literature that these bodies “literally buffer the ministry 
of education from the periodic conflicts that may arise between members of the university 
community and the government by providing an initial recourse for dispute resolution” (Saint 
et al., 2009). 
The Government of Botswana has been concerned with mushrooming private tertiary education 
institutions offering poor quality education coupled with under-qualified staff members and 
increasing enrolment figures. These institutions are blamed for lack of investment in facilities 
and, as such, the resultant implications for lower quality of education. Moreover, it has been 
noted that the staff employed by some of these institutions do not possess the relevant 
qualifications and this also affects the quality of higher education in the country. Since private 
institutions are profit oriented, they try by all means to maximise profits through increasing 
enrolment numbers. Unfortunately, they do not always improve their facilities to accommodate 
such an increase. These problems pose serious quality issues for the higher education industry. 
As a result the TEC has been formed to mediate this tension between the government and HEIs 
and provide a forum for conflict resolution. The TEC has put in place measures to avert these 
problems including the registration and accreditation procedures (Ramatsui et al., 2008:33).   
A reflection on the discussion above shows that the TEC is a buffer body as concerns the 
function of quality assurance. With this function, the TEC registers and also facilitates the 
accreditation of HEIs. However, the TEC does not act as a buffer body in the role of facilitation 
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of registration but acts as one on the role of the registration of institutions. Under the role of 
the registration of institutions, the TEC takes institutions through five stages.  
The registration process begins with the initial screening of applications and is followed by an 
evaluation by assessors, verification by the inspection committee, processing of the reports by 
APDC, and finally the approval or non-approval of the institution by the council. Approved 
institutions are then given certificates and only those that hold certificates are eligible for 
accreditation after a period of three years in operation. Within the accreditation role, the TEC 
takes institutions through five steps, which are preparation of study portfolios, peer review, site 
visits, preparation of a report by reviewers, and finally the recommendation for accreditation 
by the TEC council to the minister. 
 When it comes to the function of accreditation, the TEC does not perform the accreditation 
process like other quality assurance bodies in other countries. For example, in South Africa, 
the Council on Higher Education (CHE), a statutory body entrusted with quality assurance 
performs a buffer role as opposed to an agency role (CHE, 2013). Under this role, the 
accreditation process goes through four stages, namely: receipt of application, evaluation, 
outcome and, lastly institutional, response. Although the steps followed by both the TEC and 
CHE are almost the same, there is a difference in the manner in which accreditation is conferred 
upon institutions. As opposed to the TEC, which makes a recommendation to the minister for 
accreditation, the CHE has an accreditation committee that makes the final recommendation, 
which is then sent to the Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC). In this regard, the TEC 
does not perform the accreditation role like CHE. This is due to the fact that the final stage in 
accreditation (recommendation) lies with the minister as opposed to a situation where it lies 
with the buffer body like in the case of CHE. Therefore, as the TEC does not perform both 
quality assurance roles, it acts as both a buffer (in terms of registration) and an agent (in terms 
of accreditation). This conceptualisation of the TEC as an agent will be discussed below.  
4.3.2 The conceptualisation of the TEC as an agent 
As already discussed the literature review section, an agent is an intermediary body that 
sometimes is loosely referred to as a buffer body. As opposed to mediating tension between 
two or more parties, agents are normally associated with governments and perform certain 
functions on behalf of the government (Kivisto, 2007). The distinguishing factor between 
buffer bodies and government agencies is that agencies are not independent from the 
government and normally fall within a given government ministry, whereas a buffer body is 
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independent from the government (Bekhradnia, 2005) and can sustain its intermediary role 
between government and HEIs. In this section, more emphasis will be placed on 
conceptualising the TEC as an agent of the government. This will start with a description of 
the roles and functions of the TEC that make it an agent of the government. Lastly, the different 
conceptions of the TEC as an agent from the perspective of the TEC and government officials 
will be offered. 
The function of ‘policy formulation’ is that of agent, as opposed to buffer body. Under this 
function, the TEC is expected to formulate policy on tertiary education and advise the 
government accordingly. To perform this function, the TEC works very closely with the 
government as opposed to working closely with all stakeholders. Initially this function was to 
be housed under the Ministry of Education, but due to the absence of a tertiary education 
department it was allocated to the TEC.  
In order to further discuss this role of agent, the TEC and government officials were 
interviewed to gain their perspectives. A number of key points were raised by the interviewees 
that suggested the TEC’s role as agent. One of the issues raised is that the TEC has been 
criticised by stakeholders for working too closely to the government, as opposed to acting as a 
buffer body. In fact, in their strategic plan, (Tertiary Education Council, 2010b) the TEC 
acknowledges stakeholder concerns around this issue. The stakeholders in this case are the 
HEIs. One interviewee stated that: 
The stakeholders - particularly the institutions - when we were 
reviewing our first strategic plan, they accused us of leaning too much 
to government; seeing government as the dominant stakeholder as 
opposed to themselves. And, to some extent, they were right. (Interview 
with TEC official, April 24, 2012) 
Government officials described the TEC as leaning towards the government, as opposed to 
other stakeholders. They noted that the TEC’s lack of financial independence would always 
ensure this bias. The following excerpt from an interviewed government official expands on 
this: 
… TEC will always be close to the ministry and to the government 
because government provides funding, and in an economy like ours it 
would very difficult for the TEC to claim any financial autonomy 
because where are they going to get money from? (Interview with 
MoESD official, April 25, 2012)  
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From the excerpt above, it is clear that the TEC leans towards the government. Even though 
the government official does not specify the functions in which the TEC leans towards 
government, there is a definite acknowledgement of a close relationship.   
This section has discussed the role played by the TEC as either a buffer body or a government 
agent. The following section will focus on discussing the tensions between the functions of the 
TEC. 
4.4 Tensions and conflicts within the functions of the TEC 
It is important to reflect and point out some key observations made in the literature concerning 
the way buffer bodies should function and how tensions and conflicts may play out. According 
to El-Khawas (1992), buffer bodies are intended to manage the tension between the 
government and HEIs and therefore should act as neutral parties. Ideally, buffer bodies should 
not be seen to be close to either the government or HEIs. This ‘neutrality’ is meant to empower 
the organisation and provide autonomy. However, El-Khawas (1992) argues that it is not easy 
for buffer bodies to remain neutral in their endeavour to coordinate higher education.  It is 
argued that buffer bodies are prone to manipulation due to a number of factors such as the 
organisational structure, scope of activities and cultural factors. This makes them vulnerable 
and leads to failure in that the organisation cannot maintain its position as a neutral entity 
resulting in tensions and conflicts between its functions and between its stakeholders.  
Key among the factors mentioned above is the structure of the organisation, which includes the 
source of funding, governance structure and patterns of reporting. In the case of the TEC, most 
of its funding is provided by the government, board members are appointed by the minister and 
a significant number of them are from the government. Lastly, the organisation reports directly 
to the Minister of Education, who then reports to Parliament. As observed in the literature (El-
Khawas, 1992), this arrangement makes the TEC vulnerable and also drives it closer to the 
government. In the process the organisation is likely to fail in its endeavour to maintain a 
neutral stand in the execution of its functions. With its neutrality in question, the TEC does not 
always win favour from any stakeholders, including the government. The advice given to 
government is not always heeded if it does not align with current government thinking. This is 
demonstrated by experiences of the TEC (Interview with TEC official, April 24, 2012). 
 The next section discusses internal and external conflicts and tensions within the functions of 
the TEC.  
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4.4.1 Quality assurance  
As part of its overall mandate, the TEC’s role with regards to quality assurance is to ensure that 
quality assurance procedures are in place in all tertiary education institutions. This function 
came about as the number of private HEIs increased expanding the country’s higher education 
system. In order to assess the tensions between this and other functions, this study relied on 
information gained from interviews, questionnaires and documents.  
There are many challenges that accompany this function and they are rooted in the timing of 
the establishment of the TEC. The TEC started operating in 2004 and by this time some of 
these institutions were already operational. In order to ensure the quality of education in tertiary 
institutions, the TEC developed four sets of regulations and guidelines (Ramatsui et al., 
2008:38) namely:  
(1) Regulations for establishing new private tertiary institutions (issuing of letter of interim 
authority); 
(2) Regulations for the registration of existing public and private tertiary institutions; 
(3) Regulations for the accreditation of private tertiary institutions; and  
(4) Norms and standards that guide tertiary education institutions concerning minimum 
requirements including facilities, students, staff, etc. 
 
While the TEC has done very well by developing quality assurance regulations and guidelines 
for tertiary education institutions, the implementation of these instruments has not presented 
challenges. At the time that the TEC became operational in 2004, UB was already operating a 
university-based quality assurance system (Thobega, 2010). Prior to the establishment of the 
TEC, the Government of Botswana had entrusted UB with the responsibility of assuring quality 
throughout the entire higher education system in the country, using a system of affiliation. In 
order to undertake this responsibility, UB had established the Centre for Academic 
Development (CAD). 
CAD is a quality assurance centre responsible for assuring quality in programmes offered by 
UB and its affiliates, including all colleges of education, institutes of health sciences, 
vocational technical colleges and the Botswana College of Agriculture (Thobega, 2010). The 
centre’s mandate is to promote and facilitate the overall development of academic staff and 
students in the university, and offer appropriate advice and support to the university’s affiliated 
and associated institutions. This is meant to improve the academic quality, effectiveness and 
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efficiency of the institutions, and establish an outreach programme for the institution 
(University of Botswana, 2013). A dedicated structure, the Unified Board of Affiliations, at 
UB services the affiliated institutions (Hopkin, 1999) - see figure below. 
Figure 5: Affiliation structure of the University of Botswana
University of Botswana Senate
BOARD OF AFFILIATED 
INSTITUTIONS(PRIMARY)
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR 
(AFFILIATED INSTITUTIONS)
BOARD OF AFFILIATED 
INSTITUTIONS(SECONDARY)
PRIMARY COLLEGES
TEACHER TRAINING & 
DEVELOPMENT
SECONDARY COLLEGES
 
Source: Hopkin, 1999. 
Under this system, colleges of education, institutes of health sciences and the Botswana College 
of Agriculture were affiliates of the UB and quality assurance for the public higher education 
sector was largely a preserve of UB. According to Ramatsui et al. (2008), most institutions are 
automatically affiliated to UB through the Unified Board of Affiliations and this system of 
affiliation is said to be common in many countries around the world. As of 2013, these 
institutions remain affiliated to UB pending a change in status to semi-autonomy. 
Consequently, as UB-affiliated institutions, their programmes are quality assured by UB and 
they are required to meet UB standards.  
(Thobega, 2010) claims that CAD is superior to the TEC in terms of its capacity in managing 
quality assessment and standards. He attributes this to a well-established university-based 
quality-management system complete with checks and balances, which ensure quality and the 
maintenance of standards. As a result, UB continues to form new programmes without seeking 
approval from the TEC. However, it has been noted that a fundamental limitation of the 
Tertiary Education Act of 1999 was that it did not address the issue of the existing public 
university and the legislation responsible for its creation. As a result, UB is automatically 
positioned separately and outside of the quality assessment oversight function of the TEC. Due 
to this, the TEC’s ability to function as a buffer is limited. This has created tensions between 
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the public HEIs and the TEC when they are requested to follow the TEC procedures over and 
above the ones set by UB. This places an undue burden on the institutions as there are too many 
standards and requirements to meet. However, this is expected to change when the institutions 
become semi-autonomous and are reorganised under the proposed institutional rationalisation 
option. Under this arrangement, all institutions will be reporting to one accreditation body as 
opposed to the current situation. In this case tensions and conflicts that are reported above will 
be minimised. 
Programme accreditation in HEIs is another area in which the TEC has faced challenges. 
Programme accreditation is viewed as unfair as the process is only imposed on private HEIs. 
Public HEIs are not subjected to accreditation by the TEC because the TEC is not permitted by 
the law to accredit programmes in public institutions. Nonetheless, they are audited by the 
TEC. This point is expanded on by one of the interview respondents from the TEC: 
We have insisted that all the institutions be subjected to accreditation 
both public and private alike. But the current situation is that we are not 
permitted by the law to accredit programmes for public institutions; we 
only register but don’t accredit their programmes. The assumption again 
is that public institutions have mechanisms - internal mechanisms - that 
make it possible for themselves to accredit their own programmes. 
(Interview with TEC official, April 24, 2012) 
The only ‘voice’ that the TEC has when it comes to commenting on public institutions is 
through recommendations to government. This is outlined in the following response.  
The problem is with, say infrastructure. At the moment, we are not 
actually funding the institutions, the only thing we can do is tell the 
government [which is the funder] that you need to devote a lot more 
funds to develop this or that. But when we take over the funding of the 
institutions, and we see that the institutions are not effective in the way 
programmes are delivered, then we are going to say to them: look, unless 
you increase the quality of your staff, we are going to be denying you 
funds in this or that area. But for the moment we don’t have that leverage. 
(Interview with TEC official, April 24, 2012) 
Another respondent echoed similar sentiments by stating that: 
The only way, given the limitation of the law, to at least begin to see 
whether there are quality assurance mechanisms in public institutions is 
through the annual reports that they must submit every year. (Interview 
with TEC official, April 24, 2012) 
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Although there is evidence of some engagement of the TEC with public institutions, the bulk 
of work on quality assurance matters relates to private HEIs. This supports the argument in the 
literature review chapter that the emergence of bodies like the TEC should be seen and 
appreciated within the context of the rapid expansion of the private HEIs. In effect, the TEC 
became a buffer body primarily as a result of this expansion and in the larger higher education 
sector, these private institutions remain a small percentage of HEIs. In view of this, Thobega 
(2010:2640) raises a concern about whether the TEC will ultimately be able to take control of 
the whole tertiary education system in Botswana arguing that if this does not happen then the 
mandate of the TEC might have to be revisited. 
As already discussed under the policy formulation and advisory function, the TEC continues 
to be both player and referee, even in the quality assurance function. In this regard, one of the 
interviewees depicts the challenges facing the TEC as follows: 
... in our case we have really been a player and a referee. We set 
standards, we have a quality framework which the institutions must 
follow, which is set by us, and we go on and monitor whether they are 
following this set of criteria. And I think it is wrong. These functions 
must be separated. (Interview with TEC official, September 20, 2011)  
The above citation indicates that TEC carries out many functions some of which should be 
with other bodies. Although a TEC official argues that this arrangement is not ideal, there is 
no evidence to suggest that this has caused problems, tensions or conflicts between the 
functions of the TEC and its stakeholders. Contrary to the claim above there is nothing wrong 
with the TEC performing several functions. 
Although there are no tensions and conflicts that have arisen as a result of the TEC setting up 
a quality framework and then monitoring it, there have been allegations of corruption and 
favouritism levelled against the TEC. An interview with a TEC official shed light on the 
following in that regard: 
We play the middle man’s role. People are not used to having a 
regulatory body like TEC … and sometimes [we are] accused of 
corruptly registering institutions and not going far enough in terms of 
quality assurance. Sometimes we are accused by those being rejected 
from registration of being biased. (Interview with TEC official, 
September 21, 2011) 
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It has been reported that some institutions, in failing to meet the required standards, appealed 
to the Minister of Education and Skills Development to intervene in the accreditation process; 
they were referred back to the TEC by the ministry. This indicates a lack of understanding as 
to what is expected of the TEC and the procedures to be followed during the accreditation 
process. This however does not indicate that there are tensions or conflicts between the roles 
and functions of the TEC. According to the TEC accreditation rules and regulations for private 
institutions (C.665: 13) “… an institution may lodge with the Minister an appeal against a 
recommendation by the council within 14 days of notification of the council’s decision”. 
Therefore, if institutions appeal to the minister this should not be viewed as an act against 
normal practice. 
As already mentioned, there are claims that all tertiary education institutions should be 
accredited by the TEC (Thobega, 2010).  However, it has to be noted that in some other 
countries like Australia, some institutions are accorded the status to self-regulate due to their 
good internal quality-assurance systems (Van Damme, 2004). This does imply the existence 
of parallel systems of accreditation where there is a national quality assurance system and 
various quality-assurance systems for different higher education institutions. Despite this 
being the case, there are no reported tensions that have taken place in such a system. However, 
this differs with the situation in Botswana where, as already stated some higher education 
institutions are torn in between two parallel systems of quality assurance in the form of the 
CAD at UB and the TEC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Stakeholder's satisfaction with TEC's performance in quality assurance 
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Source: Institutional head questionnaire data. 
This study assessed the performance of the TEC on the function of quality assurance by asking 
HEIs to state their level of satisfaction on a Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree. From the figure above, 15 (62%) of the respondents are in favour of the statement 
“stakeholders are satisfied with TEC’s performance in quality assurance.” This is supported 
by one of the interviewees by stating that: “so far I am satisfied with the overall performance 
of TEC in ensuring quality considering that there was nothing when we started so I am very 
much satisfied” (TEC official, September 23 2011).  
In summary, it can be argued that there are no tensions and conflicts between the roles and 
functions of the TEC and its stakeholders on the function of quality assurance. As demonstrated 
in literature, buffer bodies, agents and higher education councils are able to conduct one or 
more functions depending on the needs of a particular country. The concerns and issues raised 
around unequal treatment for public and private HEIs and the existence of parallel systems of 
accreditation are found to be due to the limitations on the TEC’s mandate according to the 
Tertiary Education Act of 1999 and that some institutions are according self-regulatory powers 
depending on the level of their internal quality-assurance systems. This, however, does not 
indicate the existence of tensions between the role and function of quality assurance and the 
TEC stakeholders. 
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4.4.2 Policy formulation 
According to Section 5(2) of the Tertiary Education Act of 1999, the TEC is mandated to 
“formulate policy on tertiary education matters and advise government accordingly”.  This 
mandate was partly fulfilled by the organisation when it released the first Tertiary Education 
Policy for Botswana titled Towards a Knowledge Society in 2008 (Tertiary Education Council, 
2008b). In this policy, the TEC articulates the need for an integrated and cohesive approach to 
human resource planning in Botswana, hence the establishment of the Human Resource 
Development Council. The policy also talks about increased access for students, relevant 
education that supports the economic and social needs of the nation, and improved research 
capacity. Therefore, the TEC plays an important role as regards this function.  
However, this role contradicts the norm in the country where policy formulation is the sole 
responsibility of the government. Cloete et al. (1996), as highlighted in the literature review 
chapter, argues that higher education policy belongs to the government as the government sets 
priorities for the higher education sector. The respondents’ views are also in agreement with 
this. One respondent from the TEC illustrates this point thus: 
The formulation of policy is not the responsibility of the TEC. The issue 
of policy formulation is the responsibility of the state. But you know the 
challenge that we are facing in our organisation or even education sector. 
There should be a department within the Ministry of Education that deals 
with tertiary education matters. The department, on behalf of the state, 
should be responsible for the formulation of the tertiary education policy. 
All the education levels are represented within the Ministry of Education, 
i.e. primary education, secondary education and vocational education. 
But there is no department of tertiary education and at the end of the day 
we, as a buffer body - TEC, we are compelled to do the policy 
formulation. It shouldn’t be our responsibility. (Interview with TEC 
official, September 23, 2011) 
The MoESD official interviewed for the study also agreed that: 
The tertiary education policy is currently housed at the TEC, but that is 
a provisional arrangement - because then there was no structure within 
the Ministry of Education to take charge of the policy domain, because 
the TEC is supposed to be responsible for the implementation side. But 
then what happened, because of the gap that existed, the policy ended up 
being housed at the TEC. (Interview with MoESD, April 25, 2012) 
Another respondent from the TEC concurred with the above claims by stating 
that: 
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… policy belongs to the state, to the ministry. But like I indicated to you, 
there is a problem within our Ministry of Education. You will find that 
at all the levels of education - pre-primary, primary, secondary - they 
have departments, and you will find that in the department that deals with 
higher education there is nothing. So issues of higher education, we take 
them directly to the [Permanent Secretary] and then to the minister, and 
even the Permanent Secretary you will find that it’s not a priority. We 
really struggle. (Interview with TEC official, April 24, 2012) 
The apparent trend in literature is such that policy formulation function is the responsibility of 
the government and not of the TEC. This function temporarily resides with the TEC as there 
is no dedicated tertiary education department within the MoESD. As a result, the TEC finds 
itself in a position where it has to formulate policy and, at the same time, implement it. 
According to the TEC, the absence of a department of tertiary education in the education 
ministry is a major problem as they play both ‘judge and jury’ (Interview with TEC official, 
September 23, 2011) raising concerns about the objectivity of their recommendations. The 
following excerpts were captured from interviews with a MOESD official and a TEC official 
respectively: 
… policy is a government property, and then the TEC is an agent to 
implement the government policy. As I say it was just a temporary 
arrangement that the policy be housed there. But the policy, like all other 
government policies, has to come and reside in the government and then 
the TEC will be responsible for facilitating the process of 
implementation. (Interview with MoESD official, April 25, 2012) 
An interviewee from the TEC expressed the following views regarding the issue: 
... the mandate is very broad, it ranges from quality assurance, regulation; 
it even speaks of policy formulation which is quite strange because you 
don’t find a government agency being responsible for that. (Interview 
with TEC official, April 24-25, 2012) 
However, one could argue that there is nothing inappropriate with the TEC implementing a 
policy that they have devised as it is common practice in other countries around the world. 
Despite the TEC’s complaints that they cannot play “judge and jury”, there have been no 
conflicts nor tensions reported as a result of this arrangement. The TEC feels their role in the 
policy function ought to be purely advisory. As already mentioned, buffer bodies, agents and 
higher education councils are able to play several roles and, as such, this should not be a 
problem for the TEC. 
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In addition to assessing conflicts and tensions with the function of quality assurance, the study 
also sought to assess the performance of the TEC as regard this function. A survey method was 
used and it was administered to the heads of institutions. In this survey questions were asked 
about the TEC’s policy formulation function. Although the respondents agree that it is not the 
responsibility of the TEC to formulate policy, they note that the organisation has done a good 
job as the policy has been widely accepted by higher education stakeholders. This is evidenced 
in the figure below where 18 (75%) of the respondents to the survey conducted for this study 
agree/strongly agree with the statement “the TEP is generally accepted by all stakeholders.” In 
addition, the results of the study show that there are no tensions or conflicts caused by the TEC 
performing this role. Therefore it can be concluded that the TEC has executed this function 
very well without generating any conflicts. 
 
Figure 7: General acceptance of the Tertiary Education Policy by the stakeholders 
 
Source: Institutional head questionnaire data. 
It is clear from the interview responses that different stakeholders feel that the function is 
misplaced within the TEC. Although the TEC has been mandated with formulating policy for 
higher education in the country, there seems to be a general consensus that the function of 
policy formulation should not be divorced from the government (De Boer, 1992; Schmidtlein 
& Berdhal, 1992; Bekhradnia, 2006; Fielden, 2008). Instead, buffer bodies should concern 
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themselves with higher education sector planning in which they assess the needs of the 
industry, set goals and also recommend priorities (Schmidtlein & Berdhal, 1992). In addition, 
Schmidtlein and Berdhal (1992) argue that buffer bodies should also be involved in policy 
analysis and problem resolution through conducting research on the long-term issues of the 
higher education industry.  
Despite the TEC’s role in policy formulation, in contradiction to what is being done in other 
countries, no tension or conflict is indicated between the roles and functions of the TEC and its 
stakeholders. In addition, the assessment of the TEC’s performance on this function, based on 
the survey results, indicates that a significant number of respondents agree that the TEC has 
done a good job.  
4.4.3 Coordination of planning and development of higher education in Botswana 
The specific mandate of the TEC as regards the coordination of planning and development of 
higher education in Botswana is part of the already stated functions of the TEC. According to 
section 5 (2) of the Tertiary Education Act of 1999 TEC is mandated to “coordinate the long 
term planning and overall development of the tertiary education” (Republic of Botswana, 
1999). In order to assess the tensions related to this function, secondary data sources, interviews 
and questionnaires were used.  
As part of its coordination function, the TEC is expected to plan for the funding of tertiary 
education research including the recurrent and development needs of public tertiary institutions 
by receiving and reviewing budgets of public tertiary institutions (Tertiary Education Council, 
2010a:2). Consequently, the TEC has developed a funding model to help guide the funding of 
higher education and submitted it to the Minister of Education and Skills Development. In this 
case, before HEIs are funded by the government, they are subjected to a rigorous process of 
budget assessment by the TEC. However, there are delays in finalising the model and so the 
government continues to fund higher education without the input of the TEC. Although the 
TEC has not fully assumed this function, it is expected that as the funding model is finalised, 
the TEC will administer or allocate budgetary funds directly to the institutions. 
The coordination of higher education by the TEC has proven a challenge for the organisation 
and this is blamed on the fragmented nature of the higher education system. Commenting on 
the institutional level, Thobega (2010) notes that the different government institutions are 
placed under the training division of relevant ministries. For example, teacher training colleges 
fall under the Department of Teacher Training and Development administered by the Ministry 
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of Education and Skills Development, institutes of health sciences are administered by the 
Ministry of Health and the Botswana College of Agriculture falls under the Ministry of 
Agriculture. In addition, the Botswana College of Agriculture, the institute of health sciences 
and teacher training colleges are also affiliated to UB. All these issues were raised as concerns 
within the Tertiary Education Policy of 2008. Although the notion of these institutions falling 
under relevant ministries was initially a good one, the arrangement is reported to constrain the 
TEC in its efforts to coordinate higher education in the country and to carry out some of its 
functions relating to quality assurance and coordination. This is evidenced by the following 
quote from one of the interviewees: 
… the tertiary education landscape as it is now – we have several 
institutions falling under several or different line ministries, so that the 
College of Agriculture falls under the Ministry of Agriculture; the 
accountancy college under Ministry of Finance, the institutes of health 
training falling under the Ministry of Health. We have the wildlife 
training institute falling under the Ministry of Wildlife, Environment and 
Tourism. So we have that kind of fragmentation at the moment. Each of 
these individual or respective institutions submits their budgets directly 
to their line ministries. (Interview with TEC official, April 24, 2012) 
Another respondent from the TEC had this to say:  
There is so much fragmentation within the sector, even at the system 
level. That is the reason why BOTA and the TEC are merging - the 
fragmentation at this level is so pronounced. Look at what is happening. 
BOTA was under the Minister of Labour and Home Affairs. TEC is 
under the Minister of Education. If you go to the institutional level it’s 
worse. Botswana College of Agriculture is under the Minister of 
Agriculture, the Institute of Health is under the Minister of Health; others 
are under finance, under education - what kind of system is that? It’s not 
coherent… You will find one institution with two registrations. It’s really 
cumbersome. So there is so much duplication of roles and it defeats the 
whole effort of synergy. That is the reason why we do systems and 
institutional reconfiguration. So the system is the one of merging TEC 
and BOTA, and reconfiguring the whole education - we are pulling all of 
these institutions into the Ministry of Education and we have started that 
process. (Interview with TEC official, April 24, 2012) 
As indicated in above quote, the HEIs fall under different ministries. It is argued that this makes 
it very difficult for the TEC to coordinate the tertiary education sector. One institution would 
have two accreditations, one from BOTA for certificate programmes and one from the TEC for 
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diploma and degree courses. In relation to fragmentation, the respondents claimed a duplication 
of roles by both the TEC and BOTA, which defeats the whole effort at creating synergy. The 
respondent went on to state that this duplication is the rationale for merging TEC and BOTA 
and pulling all HEIs into the MOESD.  
Data emerging from both the interviews and document review and as acknowledged in 
Botswana’s Tertiary Education Policy “Towards a Knowledge Society” (2008), is that 
Botswana’s higher education system is characterised by fragmentation at governance level. 
This fragmentation is prevalent throughout and especially evident among public institutions 
that are established and operating under different ministries. This fragmentation manifests itself 
in the form of multiple and ambiguous accountabilities and a lack of coherence (NHRDS, 
2009). Consequently, this makes it very difficult for the TEC to coordinate the higher education 
system and also affects their execution of other functions, in particular that of quality assurance, 
as discussed above. This problem is deeply rooted in the role that the state plays in higher 
education and relates to the way in which it manages HEIs in general and public institutions in 
particular. By virtue of being public institutions, colleges of education and institutes of health 
sciences remain the responsibilities of the various ministries. Therefore, it is claimed that the 
TEC finds it difficult to apply itself to these institutions due to existing arrangements such as 
those relating to the accreditation of programmes via UB and the ownership of public 
institutions. 
At the system level, the relationship between the TEC and BOTA and their overlapping 
mandates is a recurring theme. Both bodies are both responsible for accrediting HEIs in 
Botswana. In order to solve the problem of overlapping mandates, the Tertiary Education 
Policy of 2008 recommended that the TEC and BOTA merge to form a new organisation, to 
be named the Human Resource Development Council (Government of Botswana, 2008). It is 
argued that for as long as Botswana’s tertiary education continues to be fragmented the TEC 
will find it difficult to achieve its role of coordinating tertiary education. In terms of the 
different government institutions that fall under different ministries, it was agreed that colleges 
of education and institutes of health sciences would be pulled together through a rationalisation 
process. However, Thobega (2010) observes that eight years after this resolution was taken, 
the merger and establishment of the new body is yet to take effect.  
The Botswana higher education scenario makes for interesting debate around coordination of 
HEIs. The discussion above suggests that all institutions should be put under one administration 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
and the TEC be accorded the responsibility of overseeing them. However, a review of the 
literature indicates that Botswana’s fragmented higher education system is not the only one. 
For example, the South African higher education sector has the same challenge (Cloete & 
Muller, 1998:13). Cloete and Muller (1998) further noted the existence of two camps: one 
opposing the aggregation of technikons and universities and the other one favouring 
aggregation. Those in opposition argued that the knowledge function of technikons did not 
match that of universities and since their orientation is purely vocational, they ought to remain 
as such. On the other hand, those who favoured aggregation argued that a unified but highly 
differentiated higher education system can respond well to the demands of the industrial labour 
force making it easier for institutions to respond to market demands. In 1996 through its report, 
the NCHE ultimately recommended that higher education continue to be offered by different 
institutions with some offering higher education programmes and some offering degree 
programmes. The commission also recommended that the South African higher education 
system be conceptualised, planned and governed as a single coordinated system in recognition 
of the diversity of HEIs.  
Based on the South African experience, it can be concluded that the view that all HEIs should 
fall under the administration of the TEC is not the only ideal arrangement. In fact, in other 
countries, different types of HEIs are being accredited by different organisations. Therefore, in 
conclusion, Botswana’s higher education system, although reported to be fragmented, is not 
different from other higher education systems. In fact, it is the default system used in other 
countries with differentiated higher education systems. 
Lastly, the study sought the perceptions of the TEC as regards its performance on the function 
of coordination of planning and development of higher education in Botswana. The results of 
the survey are shown in the figure below. According to the survey results, 14 (58%) of the 
respondents agree/strongly agree that the TEC has performed very well on the function of 
coordination in the planning and development of higher education. However, 3 (13%) of the 
respondents disagree/strongly disagree that the TEC has done well on the function mentioned 
above. A further 38% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that 
the TEC has done well on the coordination of planning and development of higher education 
in the country. In a nutshell, it can be concluded that the TEC has performed very well on this 
function as shown by lack of conflicts and tensions caused by this function and the perceptions 
of the respondents on its performance. 
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Figure 8: The performance of the TEC on the function of coordination 
 
Source: Institutional head questionnaire data. 
4.5 Autonomy  
The TEC has been mandated with the role of coordinating higher education in the country and 
acting as an intermediary between HEIs and the government. In order to fulfil this role buffer 
bodies should ideally be free to perform their role without outside interference (Saint et al., 
2009). Autonomy is the terminology used in the literature to describe a situation where buffer 
bodies are able to execute their functions without outside interference. As observed in the 
literature there are different kinds of autonomy: relational, financial and positional autonomy. 
Using these different kinds of autonomy, the TEC was assessed to determine the extent to 
which it is autonomous from the government.  
In order to assess the autonomy of the TEC as a buffer body and a government agent, firstly 
interviews were carried out with the TEC and government officials to establish their level of 
understanding of the concept of autonomy and also gain an insight into the autonomy of the 
TEC from their perspective. Secondly, a question of how autonomous the TEC is perceived to 
be was posed to the respondents of a questionnaire, which was distributed to heads of HEIs. It 
has been observed that different stakeholders hold different views on what constitutes 
autonomy. These differing perspectives are key to understanding the autonomy of the TEC. 
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Lastly, documents were used to complement data obtained from the use of questionnaires and 
interviews. 
Different conceptions of autonomy were revealed in the interviews with government and TEC 
officials. Common dimensions identified by interviewees included positional and financial 
autonomy. According to Maton (2005), in positional autonomy, positions of governance 
determine the autonomy of agencies where the board of an organisation dominated by 
government officials has limited autonomy and vice versa. In the case of the TEC, there is a 
governing council set up to help run the organisation. As indicated under the section on the 
governing structure of the TEC, the council comprises 14 non-executives and the executive 
secretary who are all appointed by the Minister of Education and Skills Development. Guided 
by the Tertiary Education Act of 1999, the council is responsible for setting the direction of the 
TEC. Of great significance about the composition of the TEC is the number of positions 
reserved for the government and the powers bestowed upon the Minister. As argued in the 
literature, this has a bearing on the way buffer bodies are able to execute their mandate. Maton 
(2005) posits that in a situation where organisations are dominated by outsiders in terms of 
governance positions, that organisation’s autonomy is likely to be eroded. Likewise with TEC, 
where the majority of positions in the council are reserved for government officials indicating 
that TEC’s autonomy is under serious threat. In terms of positional autonomy, most positions 
of governance in the organisation’s board are held by stakeholders from the government. All 
members of the council are appointed by the Minister of Education and Skills Development. 
The Minister’s powers are clearly outlined in the Tertiary Education Act of 1999. The Minister 
wields more power than any other member of the council. In particular, section 8.2 of the 
Tertiary Education Act of 1999 confers upon the Minister the power to remove members of the 
TEC Council for reasons outlined in the Act. In addition, according to the Tertiary Education 
Act of 1999, the chairperson of the council is appointed by the President, whereas other council 
members are appointed by the Minister of Education and Skills Development. According to a 
document prepared by the European Association of Quality Agencies (EAQA), buffer bodies 
should be independent such “ ...that they have autonomous responsibility for their operations 
and that the conclusions and recommendations made in their reports cannot be influenced by 
third parties such as higher education institutions, ministries or other stakeholders” (EAQA, 
2005). As things stand with the TEC, the degree of power bestowed upon the Minister of 
Education and Skills Development makes the organisation vulnerable and results in relatively 
weak positional autonomy.  
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One other form of autonomy referred to during the interviews was financial autonomy. As the 
situation stands, the TEC is almost fully funded (about 95%) by the government and the 
remainder generated by the organisation through payment of fees and other sources of revenue 
(TEC official, April 25, 2012). One respondent argued that for as long as the organisation is 
funded by the government, it will not be independently run from the government. According 
to the ministry official: 
 … TEC will always be close to the ministry and to the government 
because government provides funding, and in an economy like ours it 
would very difficult for TEC to claim any financial autonomy because 
where are they going to get money from? (Interview with MoESD 
official, April 25, 2012)  
One interviewee stated that “…once you are financially dependent on the government, you can 
only be limited in what you can and what you cannot do” (Interview with TEC official, April 
24-25, 2012). However, El-Khawas (1992) has noted that there are some exceptions in which, 
despite being funded by the government, some bodies were able to maintain their independence 
from government for a very long time. However, the interviewees concur that the TEC is 
suffering from a lack of financial autonomy. Consequently, the lack of financial autonomy for 
the TEC could also have implications on its functions. However, in this study the extent to 
which lack of financial autonomy could impact on the TEC’s functions has not been 
investigated and is therefore not known. In comparison to other countries in Africa, available 
literature actually shows that higher education organisations in Africa, including buffer bodies, 
are normally funded by government (Banya & Elu, 2001; De Villiers & Steyn, 2006). Despite 
El-Khawas’s claim that buffer bodies funded by the government are more likely to favour the 
government at the expense of HEIs affecting their autonomy (El-Khawas, 1992), there is no 
evidence in the literature linking lack of autonomy to funding. In addition to the use of 
interviews, a survey questionnaire was administered to the institutional heads in the 32 HEIs 
to assess stakeholder perceptions on the autonomy of the TEC. The respondents were asked to 
state their level of agreement on the statement: “The TEC enjoys a great deal of autonomy from 
the state”. It generally emerged that the majority of the respondents did not agree that the TEC 
enjoyed “a great deal of autonomy.” 
The figure below shows that 14 (58%) of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the statement “the TEC enjoys a great deal of autonomy from the state”.  Conversely, 
only 8 (33%) of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the TEC enjoyed a great 
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deal of autonomy and consider it therefore an autonomous organisation. This was mainly 
blamed on the Tertiary Education Act of 1999 that gives the government more control on the 
operations of the TEC. An additional issue was raised regarding accountability procedures. 
Instead of accounting to the Minister, the respondents felt that the TEC should account directly 
to Parliament to avoid any political interference from the Minister of Education.   
Figure 9: The respondents’ views on the autonomy of the TEC 
 
 Source: Institutional head questionnaire data. 
The need for highly autonomous buffer bodies is emphasised in a document prepared by ENQA 
whose recommendation was that buffer bodies should be accorded some independence from 
the government, HEIs and other stakeholders (ENQA, 2005). According to this document, 
buffer bodies should be independent to the extent that they have control over their operations. 
This is meant to empower them enabling impartial execution of their duties. In addition, at least 
in the context of the US, HEIS were found to be responsive to quality assurance control 
measures in contexts where highly autonomous bodies were in charge as compared to where 
the government was in charge (Ewell, 2008). Consequently, this emphasises the need for buffer 
bodies to be accorded greater autonomy to allow them to operate freely so that they can deliver 
on their mandate. This means that a situation where the TEC naturally leans towards the 
government with the interference of the government, the TEC’s autonomy is likely to be 
affected. 
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Reports that the TEC’s autonomy is under serious threat need to be placed in context. The 
Tertiary Education Act of 1999 clarifies some of the misconceptions around the TEC’s 
autonomy. The Act never refers to the TEC as a buffer body and instead defines the TEC as a 
“council tasked with the responsibility of promotion and coordination of tertiary education and 
for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in 
tertiary institutions” (Government of Botswana, 1999:3-15). In effect, the Act describes the 
TEC as more of government agent than buffer body. It is not surprising therefore that the 
findings of the study indicate that the TEC enjoys limited autonomy from government.  
4.6 Summary of the key findings 
Before highlighting the key findings of the study, it is important to first reflect on the objectives 
of the study as stated in the introduction. The study set out to examine the roles and functions 
of the TEC in higher education governance in Botswana. 
The study was guided by the following objectives: 
a) To examine the roles and functions of the TEC in Botswana’s higher education with 
regard to policy formulation, quality assurance and coordination in the planning and 
development of tertiary education. 
b) To explore the potential tensions between the roles and functions of the TEC and those 
of some of its key stakeholders (government and HEIs). 
c) To establish the perceived performance of the TEC in relation to three functions of 
policy formulation, quality assurance and coordination in the planning and 
development of tertiary education. 
First of all, the study attempted to establish whether the TEC was acting as a buffer or an 
agency in terms of three selected functions. In terms of the function of quality assurance it has 
found that the TEC acts both as government agent and buffer body regarding the accreditation 
and registration of institutions respectively. The registration process where TEC acts as a buffer 
involves five stages and starts with the initial screening of the application, followed by an 
evaluation of the application by assessors, verification by the inspection committee, processing 
of reports from the management by APDC and, finally, the approval or non-approval of the 
application by the TEC with the awarding of a certificate of approval. The accreditation process 
follows the registration process and only institutions with registration certificates are eligible 
to apply. This process starts with the preparation of self-study portfolios by HEIs and this is 
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followed by a peer-review exercise by academics and professionals, site visits, response from 
institutions, recommendation by the APDC to the council, which then makes a 
recommendation to the minister on whether to accredit an institution or not. An important 
distinction under the quality assurance function is that the TEC registers both public and private 
institutions, but when it comes to the accreditation function only private institutions are 
subjected to this exercise. This finding is consistent with observations made in the literature 
where buffer bodies could either be responsible for regulating either private institutions only, 
or public institutions only, or a combination of both (Nkunya, 2012). The second function that 
was assessed relates to the formulation of policy. In this respect, the TEC has been found to be 
performing a role associated with government agents. This is because most of the literature 
cited on the function of policy formulation associates this function with the government (De 
Boer, 1992; Schmidtlein & Berdhal, 1992; Bekhradnia, 2006; Fielden, 2008). In fact, Fielden 
(2008) has listed this function as one that should be devolved from the government. 
Secondly, the study sought to establish how different role players perceive the TEC in terms 
of the role that it plays. The findings of the study have revealed that the TEC is perceived to 
play both a buffer and a government agent role – albeit these perceptions differ in relation to 
different stakeholders and TEC functions.  
Evidence gathered from the Tertiary Education Act of 1999, views of stakeholders and other 
sources indicates that the TEC is more government agent than buffer body. However, it has 
also been revealed that the TEC acts as a buffer body in some functions, such as the quality 
assurance function, while acting as an agent for others, such as the policy formulation function. 
Although the TEC officials may view the TEC as a buffer body, this is contradicted by the 
mandate given to the TEC by the Act, in which it is described as a government agent.  
In order to address the third objective, literature focusing on Botswana’s higher education 
system was reviewed. An attempt has been made to describe the higher education system in 
Botswana, the different role players and the influence they exert on the role of the TEC. It has 
emerged that Botswana’s higher education governance is reportedly characterised by 
fragmentation and a duplication of roles, which limit the mandate of the TEC creating tensions 
between the TEC and other constituencies in Botswana’s higher education system. 
Organisations such as BOTA and UB through CAD are reported to be performing the same 
role as the TEC with respect to certain programmes and institutions. Thus, BOTA is responsible 
for accrediting vocational training institutes and CAD of UB is responsible for quality 
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assurance of colleges of education, the institutes of health sciences and the Botswana College 
of Agriculture.  
However, it has to be noted that the assertion that Botswana’s higher education system is 
characterised by fragmentation is subject to debate. The literature on the background of 
Botswana’s higher education assumes that the TEC is the only body that should be responsible 
for overseeing higher education and this does not acknowledge the fact that the higher 
education is differentiated As observed in South Africa, the higher education system is made 
up of universities and technikons, an acknowledgement that there are different levels of higher 
education.  
Likewise, the higher education system of Botswana should acknowledge that vocational 
education and university education are not the same and therefore cannot be treated in the same 
way. Furthermore, the Tertiary Education Act of 1999 clearly outlines out the TEC’s focus of 
responsibility as that of HEIs excluding vocational training institutions. On the issue of CAD 
being responsible for quality assurance in colleges of education, it has to be noted that colleges 
of education offer UB programmes and as affiliates of UB, they are accredited by them. The 
findings also revealed a problem in having the function of policy formulation being temporarily 
housed at the TEC. It has since been recommended that this function be moved to its rightful 
place in the government, since matters of policy are better dealt with at government level. 
The study also sought to establish whether tensions exist between the functions of TEC and its 
stakeholders. Although it has been reported that the TEC is torn between performing its role as 
a buffer body or a government agent and some institutions are being torn between adherence 
to the TEC and UB requirements, there has been no evidence of tensions between the TEC and 
UB. UB does not perform the same role as the TEC, instead ensuring that all the courses offered 
by its affiliates meet university standards. 
Lastly, the study sought to establish how the TEC has fared in fulfilling the selected functions. 
The findings of the study have revealed that the stakeholders are satisfied with TEC’s 
performance. The majority of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed that TEC has 
performed well on the three selected functions.  The respondents are satisfied with TEC’s role 
on policy formulation in which it has crafted a tertiary education policy and other documents 
used to guide the development of higher education in the country. 
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4. 7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the results of the analysis of the interviews, documents and 
questionnaire. Interviews were conducted with eight key informants from the TEC as well as 
the MOESD; a survey was carried out with the heads of HEIs and policy documents and other 
related institutional documents were reviewed. The results of the analysis have revealed that 
the TEC acts as both a buffer body and government agent. Furthermore, the study has revealed 
that Botswana’s higher education system is characterised by a duplication of roles, limited 
mandated of the TEC and functional tensions between the TEC and other related constituents. 
The next chapter provides a more detailed discussion of the findings and a conclusion for the 
study.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This study set out to examine the roles, functions and perceived performance of the TEC in 
higher education governance in Botswana along with the potential tensions that may exist 
between the TEC, the government and HEIs and its related stakeholders in higher education. 
Using both qualitative and quantitative research methods, the study explored the three research 
questions presented below: 
(1) How do different stakeholders conceptualise the role of the TEC in higher education in 
Botswana? 
(2) What are the potential tensions that exist between the government, the TEC and HEIs in 
terms of the roles and functions of the TEC? 
(3) What is the perceived impact of the tensions on the performance of the TEC in relation to 
the three selected functions? 
 In order to achieve the objectives of the study, the study adopted the use of a conceptual 
framework developed based on the literature on higher education governance and key concepts 
to help understand how different scholars conceptualise the key issues that are related to the 
study. By so doing, literature was reviewed to help identify the relevant concepts, including 
state steering, state control, autonomy, accountability and buffer bodies. These concepts were 
then used to help gain insight into the roles and functions of the TEC as well as investigate the 
tensions between the TEC’s functions and between its stakeholders.  
As a means of gaining data to answer the research questions, a survey was conducted among 
institutional heads to help understand their perceptions of the roles and functions of the TEC 
and interviews were carried out with the TEC and MoESD officials. In addition, data from all 
of the above was complemented with interview material obtained from the HERANA project, 
as well as documents related to the TEC. 
This concluding chapter, therefore, provides a discussion of the findings of the study and places 
them within the relevant literature to help highlight the study’s contribution to the field of 
higher education. This will be followed by sections on the implications and recommendations 
of the study, its limitations, and the overall conclusion of the study. 
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5.2 Discussion 
This section of the study offers a discussion of the key findings of the study. They are discussed 
in relation to the literature to help highlight the study’s contribution to knowledge within the 
field of higher education governance. 
5.2.1 Botswana’s higher education system and quality assurance 
Higher education in Botswana is characterised by fragmentation. This fragmentation has been 
one of the major concerns highlighted in the Tertiary Education Policy (Tertiary Education 
Council, 2006) document. The fragmentation resulted from the placement of public 
institutions, such as institutes of health sciences, Botswana College of Agriculture and colleges 
of education, in different ministries. These different ministries placed certain expectations on 
the institutions and expectations differ according to each ministry and only private institutions 
are subjected to this exercise. Rather, a special dispensation exists for public institutions that 
involve UB’s CAD. It has been argued that the current arrangement makes it difficult for the 
TEC to execute its mandate as there are complaints that institutions are not being treated 
equally. 
 However, it has to be noted that the despite the concerns raised about Botswana’s higher 
education system being fragmented, the system is similar to other countries, in particular South 
Africa, which allows for different kinds of HEIs to co-exist (Cloete & Muller, 1998). The TEC 
was established at a time when there was an already-existing, well-established quality 
assurance system in place for all public HEIs affiliated to UB and these affiliations remain in 
place to date. It is reported that there are two parallel quality-assurance systems operating in 
Botswana’s higher education system. On the one hand, the TEC registers and exercises quality 
assurance among private HEIs and, on the other hand, some public institutions are still 
affiliated to the UB through the CAD. The CAD is internationally recognised quality-assurance 
centre that ensures the overall development of academic staff and students in UB as well as 
offering support and advice to its affiliated and associated institutions. When contrasted with 
the TEC, CAD is relatively more advanced and well established (Thobega, 2010). However, it 
is important to highlight the fact that CAD is an internal quality-assurance unit within UB and 
not a parallel quality-assurance system in competition with the TEC. Although the centre is 
still responsible for accrediting colleges of higher education and institutes for health sciences 
as these institutions offer university programmes. Consequently, the TEC performs external 
quality-assurance roles whereas UB is responsible for its internal quality-assurance 
programmes. 
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5.2.2 Conceptualisation of the TEC as a buffer body versus agent 
Against the background of a fragmented higher education system in Botswana, it is 
understandable that the study has found that different stakeholders hold different conceptions 
of the TEC as a buffer body and agent. To the government, the TEC is an agent of the 
government that provides a useful ‘bridge’ between the government, the private higher 
education sector and the public sector. Conversely, the TEC views itself as a more neutral 
‘process office’ between the government, HEIs and the private sector. Although buffer bodies 
serve different functions including policy advice, funding, quality assurance and many others, 
there is a consensus on how they are defined. As noted by Saint et al. (2009), these bodies 
literally buffer the government from the periodic conflicts that may arise between HEIs and the 
government. Similarly, they also serve to shield tertiary institutions from intervention by the 
government.  
The findings of the study have revealed that the TEC views itself as a buffer body whereas the 
government sees it as a government agent. However, the Tertiary Education Act of 1999, a 
legal document which clearly outlines the constitution of the TEC describes the TEC as a 
government agent. Although the TEC aspires to becoming a buffer body, its constitution clearly 
outlines its mandate as government ‘agent’. Literature on the agencification (Eisenhardt, 1985; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Gornitzka et al., 2004) reveals that the arrangement between the TEC and 
the Government of Botswana is a common one found in many countries. Worldwide, 
governments have resorted to steering higher education through organisations like the TEC, 
which are known as government agents even though they perform the functions of buffer 
bodies. Therefore it is not surprising that there seems to be confusion over whether the TEC is 
a buffer body or a government agent.  
5.2.3 Autonomy and accountability of the TEC 
The autonomy of buffer bodies is an important aspect in the governance of higher education. 
This study therefore sought to investigate the TEC’s autonomy from government in Botswana’s 
higher education governance. As observed in relevant literature, autonomy is a very difficult 
concept to measure. This is also indicated in this study the researcher struggled to conceptualise 
and find empirical indicators. Generally the indicators showed that the TEC is perceived to be 
suffering from a lack of autonomy from the government. In fact, with respect to its policy 
advice and formulation function, this study has shown that the TEC has been operating more 
like a government department than a buffer.  
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As shown in Chapter 2, for most parts of Africa, the concept of higher education councils is 
still new (Saint et al., 2009) and these councils have had to face very dominant governments 
not willing to give away some of their powers. Consequently, bodies find it very difficult to 
work in such environments therefore this weakens the organisations’ autonomy. 
Autonomy, as it relates to buffer bodies, is defined as the ability of buffer bodies to function 
without outside interference (Saint et al., 2009). In the literature, different notions of autonomy 
have been discovered. These include positional, relational and financial autonomy. However 
in this study not all different notions of autonomy apply. The most common notion in this study 
is positional autonomy. According to Maton (2005), positional autonomy defines the nature of 
relations between specific positions in the social dimension of a context of field and positions 
in other contexts such that buffer bodies whose positions of governance are dominated by 
outsiders are said to be suffering from a weak positional autonomy and vice versa.  
In terms of positional autonomy, the study has revealed that TEC has relatively weak 
autonomy. This is evidenced by a governance structure dominated by outsiders, in particular 
government representatives. Moreover, more powers are concentrated with the Minister of 
Education and Skills Development who has the power the power to appoint and dismiss 
members of the governing council.  
Accountability is another important factor that has been used in this study to assess the role of 
TEC as a buffer body and an agent. Accountability is considered as “requirement to 
demonstrate responsible actions to one or more external constituencies” (van Vught, 
1994:355). This is meant “to constrain the corruptions of power, including fraud, manipulation, 
malfeasance and the like” (Trow, 1996:310). This normally takes place in the form of 
stakeholder representation in decision-making bodies, external evaluation by quality assurance 
bodies and regulation by buffer bodies.  
Surveyed literature shows that there are different ways in which higher education councils are 
held accountable and this depends largely on who formed the buffer body, as well as the source 
of funding (TFHES, 2000). Buffer bodies formed and funded by the government are normally 
accountable to the Minister of Education while buffer bodies formed by representatives from 
HEIs, private sector and the community account to such representatives. HEIs are likely to feel 
more aggrieved with the former arrangement creating tensions between the different 
stakeholders involved in higher education. 
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This study has revealed that the TEC is a statutory body formed by the government and, as 
such, accounts to the government, in particular to the Minister of Education and Skills 
Development. The Minister then accounts to Parliament. In addition, Parliament has set up a 
parliament statutory committee responsible for auditing the TEC. The way in which the TEC 
accounts leans more towards the government as opposed to the government, HEIs and the 
community at large. This kind of accounting has the potential to create tensions between the 
TEC and the other stakeholders. 
5.2.4 Tensions between the roles and functions of the TEC and between its stakeholders 
This study has revealed a number of findings on the internal tensions between the different 
functions of the TEC. Firstly, the higher education system in Botswana is a fragmented one in 
which different institutions belong to different ministries. This reportedly makes it very 
difficult for the TEC to coordinate HEIs as some institutions are regulated by other bodies, 
such as BOTA. In addition, when it comes to quality assurance, the TEC is only responsible 
for regulating private institutions. Public institutions such as colleges of education, institutes 
of health sciences are affiliated to UB through CAD. As a result, it is reported that there are 
two systems of quality assurance operating in the country, one for the TEC and one for UB. 
This arrangement reportedly has constrained the TEC in its effort to regulate HEIs in the 
country. As regards policy formulation, it has been found out that the TEC plays the role of 
advising the government on policy formulation while also being responsible for policy 
formulation itself. This does not sit well with stakeholders who feel that the role of policy 
formulation is the responsibility of the government and the TEC should only be responsible for 
advising the government on such. Although there are problems related with the structure of the 
higher education system, the study has not found any tensions between the roles and functions 
of the TEC and its stakeholders. The findings of the study seem to suggest that the TEC should 
be treated as a supreme body responsible for HEIs. However, as in other countries, Botswana’s 
education system is differentiated with different kinds of HEIs (i.e. universities, colleges of 
education, institutes of health sciences and vocational training centres). Therefore, it is normal 
to have bodies like BOTA holding responsibility for vocational training centres. Mention was 
also made of the existence of parallel quality assurance in the form of the CAD and the TEC. 
It is noteworthy to mention that the CAD is not an external quality-assurance body, but rather 
an internal quality-assurance system for UB programmes and its affiliated institutions. 
In addition to establishing the internal tensions between the different functions of the TEC, the 
study sought to discover the perceived effect of the tensions on the performance of the TEC. 
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In order to achieve this, the study sought the opinion of different stakeholders and also relied 
on secondary data sources. Although Botswana’s tertiary education system is reported to be 
fragmented, what is being referred to as a fragmented higher education system is actually a 
differentiated higher education system that acknowledges the variance in the types of HEIs. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the problems reported could be tension related. The tensions 
that have been identified could have had an impact on the performance of the TEC. In addition 
most of the problems reported above stem from the fact there is confusion over the nature of 
the TEC. However the Tertiary Education Act of 1999 clearly describes the TEC as a 
government agent and it therefore should not be confused with a buffer body. 
5.3 Limitations and recommendations of the study 
In this section, limitations, implications and recommendations of the study are presented. The 
findings of the study as presented above have certain implications in the way in which the TEC 
operates and the governance structure of the higher education system. The implications and 
recommendations presented herein are possibilities and options as guided by the findings of 
the study and therefore are subject to amendment.  
5.3.1 Limitations of the study 
First of all it is worth mentioning that the study investigated only certain functions of the TEC 
and left out others, primarily due to time and financial constraints. The functions that were 
selected were the policy formulation and advisory role, coordination in the planning and 
development of tertiary education, as well as quality assurance. There are functions that have 
not been included in the study, such as funding. The functions chosen for the study are the ones 
considered key to the existence of the TEC and therefore important to include in this study, at 
the expense of those excluded.   
Methodologically, this study has been limited due to a number of factors. Key among the 
limitations of the study is the choice of the methods used in the study. Methods that were 
chosen such as survey questionnaires, key informant interviews and document review have 
their own limitations, which were mentioned in the methodology section. However, in this 
study, these methods were not used in isolation; rather, triangulation has been employed to help 
overcome the limitations of these methods.  
A third limitation is about the survey. While all efforts were made to ensure input from the key 
actors, there were instances where responses from some key actors like UB were not received. 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
This is considered a limitation in that the UB is considered as a key actor in the higher education 
sector in Botswana, therefore their response would have provided a better understanding of the 
role of the TEC in higher education, especially on the quality assurance function. In addition, 
due to the complexity of the topic under study, the researcher found it difficult to conceptualise 
and find empirical indicators for the study. Hence, further research is needed to further develop 
the conceptual framework as well as develop empirical indicators for the study. 
Furthermore, it is important to state that that the researcher is a former employee of the TEC. 
Although efforts were made to ensure objectivity, it is possible that subjective interpretations 
could have been made. The researcher prepared a proposal that was accepted by the University, 
received ethics clearance for the research methods, and followed standard research guidelines 
under the supervision of two supervisors. The findings obtained from the study were discussed 
in relation to the reviewed literature to help minimise subjectivity and also give credibility to 
the findings. 
The fact that the researcher is a former employee of the TEC also benefitted the study in many 
ways, as it was easy for the researcher to gain access to the respondents. This is because the 
researcher knew who was in charge of the different organs of  the TEC from the Executive 
Secretary to the directors of different directorates ranging from Quality Assurance and 
Regulation, Policy and Planning to Institutional Funding. Having access to the different 
personnel in charge of the TEC helped accelerate the process of data collection and also helped 
the researcher obtain information that would have been very difficult for an outsider to have 
access.  
5.3.2 Recommendations 
The analysis and discussion of data has brought about the following recommendations; 
1. There is a need to further analyse the autonomy of the TEC from the government. This is 
borne from the fact that this study was very limited on the subject of autonomy owing to 
its scope, which was mainly concerned with whether the TEC was a buffer body or an 
agency and the tensions between the TEC and its stakeholders and between its roles and 
functions. Therefore the subject of autonomy was not dealt with in any depth. Given the 
wide-spread ‘agencification’ of higher education governance in Africa and beyond, gaining 
a better understanding of the precarious position (El-Khawas, 1992) of bodies such as 
quality-assurance agencies, policy advisory bodies, funding agencies, and so on in higher 
education is important. In this respect, this study has made an initial contribution to the 
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limited knowledge about higher education governance at system level in Botswana with a 
special focus on the TEC. 
2. Recommendations for further research are suggested. More detailed research on the 
specific experiences of buffer agencies in developing nations will provide information on 
the uniqueness of buffer bodies in higher education. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The first chapter introduced the study by providing background information, statement of the 
problem, research aim, objectives, questions, scope, rationale, significance and the organisation 
of the study. The second chapter reviewed available literature on the governance of higher 
education by identifying the pertinent issues in the area to help inform the study. The topics 
discussed in this chapter included governance of higher education, governance models and the 
role players in higher education. The chapter thus presents a conceptual framework for the 
study. Chapter three discussed the methodology adopted for the study as well the justification 
for adopting such a methodology. The methods used in the study include a survey, interviews, 
document analysis and analysis of data and additional interview material obtained from the 
HERANA project. The fourth chapter provided an integrated presentation and analysis of the 
data. It starts by providing background information on Botswana’s higher education, the 
various stakeholders involved, and it signals how this contributes to the tensions between the 
roles and functions of the TEC and between the TEC and its stakeholders. The chapter also 
provided an analysis of the tensions between the roles and functions of the TEC and between 
the TEC and its stakeholders. The last chapter has focused on profiling key findings of the 
study by discussing them alongside findings from existing literature. In addition, the chapter 
has proposed recommendations for future research, as well as outlining the limitations of the 
study.  
The study was based on the premise that the transformation of higher education in Botswana 
has seen the introduction of a buffer body, the TEC, tasked with the regulation of higher 
education in the country. However, the TEC has not found it easy to carry out its roles and 
functions. Background information shows that the establishment of the TEC took a long time 
to implement following recommendations for its establishment in 1993. The purpose of this 
study was to examine the roles, functions and perceived performance of the TEC in higher 
education. More specifically, the study assessed the potential tensions that exist between the 
TEC and its role players and how these tensions, if any, impact on the performance of the TEC. 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
In order to address the research problem, there were a number of questions posed by the study. 
The first question was “How do different role players conceive of the role of the TEC in higher 
education? With respect to this question the study utilised literature on the conceptualisation 
of buffer bodies to establish their meaning, how they operate and what their typical mandate 
is. It was found that buffer bodies are ideally autonomous, independent organisations that 
mediate tension between the government, HEIs and other stakeholders. Their mandate 
includes, but is not limited to quality assurance, funding and coordination in the sector. For this 
study, the TEC officials and government officials were asked to state their own understanding 
of the TEC as a buffer body. The results revealed different conceptions about buffer bodies by 
the government and the TEC officials. In addition a survey questionnaire was also distributed 
to heads of institutions to help assess the TEC’s perceived autonomy which showed that 58% 
of the respondents disagreed that the TEC enjoys autonomy.  
The second question asked by this study was “What are the potential tensions that exist between 
the different role players in terms of the roles and functions of TEC?” In order to answer this 
question available literature was reviewed and interviews were carried out with the TEC 
officials and government officials. In relation to this question the study has revealed tensions 
relating to the existence of other bodies having similar mandates like the TEC, such as UB 
(through CAD) in the function of quality assurance. There is also a tension involving the TEC 
and the government. This tension relates to the government channelling its own priorities 
through public institutions. The TEC is therefore constrained in its effort to regulate higher 
education as public institutions are not treated the same way as private institutions, in that they 
are exempted from some activities. These tensions can be better understood in terms of the 
differentiation inherent in higher education in Botswana resulting in a fragmentation of higher 
education governance that affects the TEC’s ability to perform its functions evenly across the 
sector. 
Last, but not least, the study wanted to find out the perceived performance of the TEC on the 
selected functions. In order to address this question the study relied on the use of 
questionnaires, interviews and documents. The study found that generally the perception is that 
the TEC has done fairly well in terms of delivering on its mandate amid the unfavourable 
environment in which the organisation is operating. Some of the key deliverables by the TEC 
include the formulation of the Tertiary Education Policy, development of regulations for 
programme accreditation and continuation of the registration of both public and private HEIs. 
In all these respects the survey conducted with institutional heads has shown that the TEC has 
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done well in fulfilling its mandate and there have been no conflicts or tensions between its roles 
and functions and its stakeholders. In conclusion, the question arose in the course of the study 
as to whether the TEC was acting more as a buffer body or as an agency in the way it discharged 
the three selected functions. Documents and key informants interviews provided the material 
to consider this question. The results revealed that the TEC is acting as a buffer body in some 
functions, more especially the quality assurance function, and as an agent of government in 
other functions, most evidently so with respect to policy formulation. Furthermore, the TEC’s 
role is clearly a different one in relation to private HEIS than public institutions over which it 
does not have as much authority. The study has therefore shown the effect of the differentiation 
inherent in the higher education landscape and the concomitant fragmentation of higher 
education governance in Botswana on the TEC’s role and the tensions that arise in relation to 
different role players and functions of the TEC. The study has therefore contributed to the 
understanding of higher education governance in Botswana and helped clarify some of the 
dynamics associated with buffer bodies in the governance of higher education. 
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Appendix A: Introduction letter 
 
Keitumetse Gofaone Lebotse 
P O Box 40283 
Gaborone 
15th July 2011 
_______________________ 
_______________________ 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
As a University of the Western Cape (South Africa) student, I am currently conducting a study 
on the roles and functions of the Tertiary Education Council in higher education in Botswana. 
In essence, the study seeks to investigate the tensions that exist between the TEC and the role 
players in higher education as well as tensions between the different functions of the TEC. The 
study forms the thesis component for the degree of Magister Educationis (HEMA). All the 
instruments pertaining to this study have been checked and approved in an ethical review 
process conducted by the University of the Western Cape, Senate Research Ethics Committee. 
Therefore, I will appreciate your completion of the enclosed questionnaire by 20th August 2011. 
You do not need to put your name on the questionnaire. I do realize that your schedule is busy 
and your time is valuable. I hope that the 20 minutes it will take you to complete the 
questionnaire will provide useful information for the success of this study.  
Thanking you in advance for your participation.  
If you have questions about the study, you can contact any of the persons below; 
Ms. Keitumetse Lebotse (researcher) Tel: (+267) 72758545 or Email: mkhethob@yahoo.com  
Dr Gerald Ouma (supervisor) Tel: +27 219599360 or Email: gouma@uwc.ac.za 
Dr Thierry Luescher-Mamashela (supervisor) Tel: +27 833505959 or Email: 
tluescher@uwc.ac.za 
Yours faithfully, 
Keitumetse G. Lebotse (Ms) 
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Appendix B: Interview guide for policy and planning directorate 
 
1. How long have you been Acting Director? 
2. When was the function introduced in the TEC? How does it work? 
3. The TE Act gives the TEC the power to formulate policy. What role does the Ministry 
of Education and Skills Development play in policy-making in higher education?  
4. Once the TEC has formulated policy, according to the Act, it is then supposed to “advise 
Government accordingly.” What does this mean?  
 How does it work? 
 What weight does the ‘advice’ carry? 
5. Does the Ministry have to accept the policy advice given by the TEC? What is the legal 
status of the advice? If not, how and to whom does the Minister account for not 
accepting the advice? 
6. Does the TEC have a dispute mechanism or a mechanism for challenging the Minister’s 
decision? 
7. Are there any tensions between the TEC and the Ministry around its functions? 
8. At the seminar last year (2011), you said that the Ministry is meant to make policy and 
the TEC to implement but that the TEC is both a player and referee. Please explain. 
9. Who (between the Minister and the TEC) has the power to initiate the policy-making 
agenda? 
10. What role does the public play in policy formulation and at what stages? Is the TEC 
reactive or proactive in giving policy advice? 
11.  Does the policy advice/policy formulation have to be based on research (reviews or 
commissioned)? 
12.  Does the ministry interfere with the TEC’s operations in any way?   
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix C: Interview guide for the executive secretary’s office 
 
1. The TEC was proposed in the 1993 National Commission on Education report. Can you 
give us a bit of background about the discussions and debates around that time? 
2. The Tertiary Education Act outlines three main functions of the TEC: 
 Policy-making 
 Planning and institutional oversight and coordination 
 Quality Assurance 
3. The NCE report proposed a wide range of functions for the TEC. Were all of these part 
of its establishment? If not, why not? 
 What changes in functions have there been over the years? 
4. The TEC appears to have a strong and important role in the governance of higher 
education in Botswana, e.g. it is expected to formulate policy and also accredit 
institutions etc. How has this role changed over time since its establishment? 
5. What is the TEC’s relationship with the Ministry like? Are there tensions around 
powers and accountability? 
6. What comments can you make about the level of expertise in the TEC versus that in the 
Ministry of Education and Skills Development? 
       7. Funding: 
 How is the TEC funded? (Government. fees charged etc.) 
 Does the organization have sufficient funding to carry out its mandate? 
 What impact do the funding arrangements have on the organization’s 
autonomy? 
8. Structure and composition 
      Council or board: 
 The TE Act provides for 14 members of council. Is this the number in practice? 
 What are their tasks/responsibilities? 
 What decision-making powers do the council members have? 
 What is the composition of the council? Stakeholder representation rather than expert 
body? 
 
 How are they appointed? By whom and based on what criteria? 
 Are vacancies advertised? 
 Is there a public nomination or application process? 
 Are candidates interviewed? 
 For what term? What has the practice been about the term of membership?  
 Can members be removed? Has any member been removed or forced to resign? 
 If a person was appointed while in position as vice chancellor or permanent secretary, 
do they remain if this position changes? 
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 What factors are taken into account when reappointing? 
 Have members normally been reappointed? 
 
    9.  Executive Secretary: 
 What are the Executive Secretary’s responsibilities? 
 How is s/he appointed? By whom? 
 Who can hire and fire? 
 What are the appointment criteria? 
 What kind of professional background should s/he have? 
 To whom does the Executive Secretary account/report? 
 Appointment for what period? 
 
10. Staffing: 
 What is the staff composition? 
 What are their qualifications? 
 Does the council have autonomy to appoint staff? 
 Who can hire and fire? 
 Has the staff complement grown or changed over the years? 
 What is the staff turnover like? 
 What is the level of expertise among staff/council members in comparison to the parent 
ministry? 
 Does the TEC have sufficient capacity to carry out its functions? 
 
11. Autonomy and accountability: 
 Was the organization established as a semi- or fully autonomous body? 
 What kind of autonomy (legal, and/or political)? 
 Autonomous from which actors (politicians, other external stakeholders? 
 
 The Tertiary Education Act confers complete autonomy on the TEC regarding the 
exercise of its functions. 
 Where does the TEC’s real autonomy lie? Where is its autonomy contested? 
 
 Does the TEC submit annual reports to the Minister and Parliament? 
 What happens to this report? 
 Who holds the TEC accountable for (1) finances (2) carrying out its mandate?  
 
 The TE Act says that the TEC is accountable to the Minister for a range of functions. 
How does this work in practice? 
 
 What powers does the Minister have over the TEC’s decisions/operations? 
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 Have there ever been legal challenges to the decisions of the TEC and the Minister? 
 
 To whom is the organization accountable for its substantive work and the public funds? 
(the minister, parliament, higher education institutions?) 
 What form does such accountability take? 
 
 To what extent is the TEC’s independence/autonomy key to fulfilling its functions and 
role in the governance system? 
 
  Who judges/evaluates the performance of the TEC? 
 If the TEC makes an accreditation judgment (e.g. accepting or rejecting the application 
for a new university or programme), who judges that judgment? 
 
12. The merger 
Botswana Training Authority (vocational), the TEC (HE), unit in Ministry of Finance 
(manpower planning)” 
 
 Status update? 
 How will the merger affect t the TEC’s functions/role in governance? 
Thank you for your time! 
 
  
 
 
 
 
120 
 
Appendix D: Interview guide for  directorate of quality assurance and 
regulation  
 
1. How long have you been Director of Quality Assurance? 
2. How is quality defined? 
3. The TE Act outlines the following quality assurance functions for the TEC: 
4. Accredit and approve establishment of private education institutions and to review 
/approve programmes of study in private institutions. Is this accurate? Does the 
Minister oversee accreditation of public TEIs? 
5. TEC must ensure that the quality assurance procedures are in place in all TEIs and 
to ensure audit of facilities and assessment of the adequacy in TEIs? 
6.   Is there a specific structure/committee that oversees the quality assurance function? 
7. How are members appointed? What criteria are used? 
8. How autonomous is this from the Minister? 
9. To whom does it account? 
10.  What kinds of decisions does it make? 
11.  Can aggrieved persons appeal against its decisions? Or can its decisions be   
reversed? By whom and on what grounds? 
12.  Is the Minister on Ministry involved at any stage in the monitoring process? 
13.  Can you give examples from practice on the questions above? 
14.  This leads to a question about autonomy: e.g. in the monitoring reports of the CHE 
there is no evaluation of the quality assurance function. So who judges the quality 
assurance function then? 
15.  Are the quality assurance and policy-making/policy advice roles linked in any way? 
Is there a tension between these two functions? 
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix E: Interview guide for Ministry of Education and Skills 
Development 
 
1. The TEC was proposed in the 1993 National Commission on Education report. Can you 
give us a bit of background about the discussions and debates around that time? 
2. The NCE report proposed a wide range of functions for the TEC. Were all of these part 
of its establishment? If not, why not? 
3. What changes in functions have there been over the years? 
4. The 1993 NCE report proposed that the TEC would be a buffer of some kind between the 
TEIs and government. Has this been the case? 
5. What is the perception of where the TEC is located-closer to the government or TEIs? 
Does this vary according to function? 
6. The TE Act gives the TEC the power to formulate policy. What role does the MoESD 
play in policy-making in higher education? 
7. Who (between the Minister and the Tec) has the power to initiate the policy-making 
agenda? 
8. Can the Minister or government reject a policy formulated by the TEC? 
9. What role does the public play in policy formulation and at what stage? 
10.  What is the TEC’s relationship with the ministry like? Are there tensions around powers 
and accountability? 
11.   Why is higher education not represented in the Ministry of Education and Skills 
Development? 
12.  What do you regard as the TEC’s most important functions? 
13.   Are there any functions which you don’t think it should be undertaking? 
14.  Which does it do well and which does it not do well at? 
15.  Is there a conflict of interest between the TEC’s role of accrediting institutions and 
programmes on the other hand, and assessing quality at the same time? 
16.  Is the TEC adequately staffed/resources to carry out its functions? 
17.  Is there any overlap in the functions between the TEC and the MoESD? 
18.  If the TEC wasn’t there, which body/ies would be carrying out those functions? 
19.  What is the relationship the MoESD and the TEC’s Council and staff? 
20.  Is the TEC sufficiently/ appropriately accountable? 
21.  What do you think have been the major changes over the years in terms of the TEC’s 
functions? 
22.  What changes do you see on the horizon? 
23.  Given that the TEC is publicly-funded, is it regarded / is there a perception that it is 
serving the interests of government, and at the expense of the private institutions? 
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix F: Guide for document review 
 
List of documents consulted for the case study: 
1. Governance of Higher Education 
2. Higher Education Planning, Coordination and Development 
3. Quality Assurance in Higher Education 
  
 Tertiary Education Policy of 2008 
 Tertiary Education Act of 1999 
 Previous Consultancy Reports 
 Report on National Human Resource Development Strategy 
 Tertiary Education Annual Reports 
 Challenges and Choices  
 The Revised National Policy on Education 
 Quality Assurance Manual. 
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Appendix G: Informed consent to participate in the study 
 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the role and functions of the TEC in higher education 
in Botswana along with the tensions that may arise between the TEC and related role players 
in higher education and between different functions of the TEC. As a higher education expert, 
your perspectives will be extremely helpful in understanding the research. 
 
Study procedures 
Should you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to participate in one tape recorded 
interview at your place of work with the possibility of one follow-up telephone interview. Face-
to-face interviews are expected to last one hour and telephone interviews will last 
approximately half an hour. Both interviews will take place during normal hours at a time 
convenient to you. 
 
Alternative 
You have the alternative to choose not to participate in this study. 
 
Risks 
There are no known risks to those who participate in the study. 
 
Confidentiality 
All your study records will be highly confidential. However, the participants should note that 
their words may be quoted in the final report but that their names will not be used in conjunction 
with the quote. Participants are warned that people might guess who they are from their 
positions. All interview transcripts will only be accessible to the researcher. None of the data 
will be shown to any other person besides the researcher. However, it is important to note that 
my supervisors have the right to access these records, but must keep them completely 
confidential. The researcher will not publish anything that would let people know who you are. 
 
If you are willing to take part, please sign below. 
 
I give my consent to take part in this study. By signing this form I am agreeing to take part in 
the study. 
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________________________________________ 
Signature of the person taking part in this study 
 
________________ 
Date 
 
Questions/concerns/complaints 
For any information concerning this study, please contact any of the persons below: 
Ms K. G. Lebotse (researcher) at mkhethob@yahoo.com 
Dr Gerald Ouma (supervisor) at gouma@uwc.ac.za 
Dr Thierry Luescher-Mamashela at tluescher@uwc.ac.za 
  
 
 
 
 
125 
 
Appendix H: Interview guide - policy and planning 
 
1. How long have you been working here? 
2. Could you describe your job position in your organization? 
3. Briefly describe the mandate and functions of Tertiary Education Council related to the 
Tertiary Education Policy? 
4. As a member of Policy and Planning directorate, do you think the Tertiary Education Council 
has done enough in terms of policy formulation? Please explain. 
5. Do you think the policy is generally accepted and supported by all stakeholders? Explain. 
6. To what extent is the Tertiary Education Policy relevant to the country’s current PESTLE 
environment? 
7. What aspects of the TEP do you think need to be addressed in order to improve the tertiary 
education sector? Explain. 
8. How effective is the Tertiary Education Policy in dealing with tertiary education challenges?  
9.  a) What is the government’s level of involvement in policy formulation?  
     b) How does this affect TEC’s ability to formulate policy? 
10. Being the Policy formulator, do you think the TEC should go ahead in implementing and 
monitoring the Policy? 
11. What challenges does TEC face in delivering to its functions? 
12. What is your overall impression of your department in terms of performance? 
Conclusion  
Is there anything you would like to comment on that we may have not covered in this interview? 
                                               Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix I: Interview guide - quality assurance 
 
1. How long have you been working here? 
2. Could you describe your job position in your organization? 
3. What is QA in relation to the TEC mandate and TEIs? 
4. How do you quality assure the TEIs? 
5. a)  Which guiding principles/instruments are in place to ensure quality in TEIs? 
    b) Are these instruments adequate enough to guide quality assurance in TEIs? 
6. How does TEC ensure quality instruments are maintained? 
7. How often are quality instruments reviewed? 
8. Does TEC have the capacity to guide QA in TEIs? 
9. What role do stakeholders play in contributing towards quality assurance in tertiary 
institutions?   
10. a) What challenges does TEC face in  delivering to its functions? 
      b) What do you think can be done to overcome such challenges? 
11. Are you satisfied with the overall performance of TEC in ensuring quality in tertiary 
institutions? 
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix J: Interview guide - executive secretary’s office 
 
1. How long have you been working here? 
2. Could you describe your job position in your organization? 
3. Briefly describe the mandate and functions of Tertiary Education Council? 
4. Do you think the TEC has done enough in terms of policy formulation? Please explain. 
5. Is the policy generally accepted and supported by all stakeholders? 
6. How relevant is the TEP to the country’s current PESTLE needs?  
7. How effective is the TEP in dealing with tertiary education matters? Explain 
7.  a) Is there any strategy aimed at the coordination and long term planning of tertiary 
education? 
     b) Is the strategy used to inform decision making in tertiary education? Explain. 
8. Does TEC have the capacity to implement the strategy? Explain. 
9. What do you think can be done to improve the coordination and planning tertiary 
education? 
10. a) Which guiding principles are in place to ensure quality in TEIs? 
11. What are the outcomes of QA? 
12. Does TEC have enough capacity to guide QA in TEIs? 
13. What role do stakeholders play towards QA in TEIs? 
14. What challenges does TEC face in delivering to its functions? 
15. Are you satisfied with the overall performance of TEC? 
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix K: List of all Tertiary Education Council’s registered higher 
education institutions 
 
      Public Institutions 
1. Bamalete Lutheran School of Nursing  
2. Botswana Accountancy College 
3. Botswana College of Agriculture 
4. Botswana College of Distance and Open Leaning (Letter of Interim Authority) 
5. Botswana College of Engineering and Technology-BCET (Letter of Interim 
Authority) 
6. Botswana International University of Science and Technology (Letter of Interim 
Authority) 
7. Botswana Wildlife Training Institute 
8. Deborah Retief Memorial School of Nursing 
9. Defense Command and Staff College (Letter of Interim Authority) 
10. Francistown College of Education 
11. Francistown College of Technical and Vocational Education (Letter of Interim 
Authority) 
12. Gaborone Technical College (Letter of Interim Authority) 
13. Institute of Development Management 
14. Institute of Health Sciences, Francistown 
15. Institute of Health Sciences, Gaborone 
16. Institute of Health Sciences, Lobatse 
17. Institute of Health Sciences, Molepolole 
18. Institute of Health Sciences, Serowe 
19. Molepolole College of Education 
20. Serowe College of Education 
21. Seventh Day Adventist School of nursing 
22. Test tender 
23. Test tender 
24. Tlokweng College of Education 
25. Tonota College of Education 
26. University of Botswana 
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Private Institutions 
1. ABM University College 
2. Assembly Bible College (Letter of Interim Authority) 
3. Ba Isago University College ( UNISA study centre) 
4. Boitekanelo Training Institute (Letter of Interim Authority) 
5. Botho College (formerly NIIT Education and Training Centre) 
6. Damelin (Letter of Interim Authority) 
7. Flying Mission Services ((Letter of Interim Authority) 
8. Gaborone Institution of Professional Studies 
9. Gaborone Universal College of Law (Letter of Interim Authority) 
10. Kgolagano College of Theoretical Education (Letter of Interim Authority) 
11. Limkokwing University College of Creative Technology (Letter of Interim Authority) 
12. Management College of Southern Africa-MANCOSA (Letter of Interim Authority) 
13. New Era College of Arts Science and Technology (Letter of Interim Authority) 
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Appendix L: Questionnaire 
 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TERTIARY EDUCATION COUNCIL 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS TO BE FILLED BY INSTITUTIONAL HEADS IN THE 
TERTIARY EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS 
The questionnaire aims to assess the Tertiary Education Council (TEC) with regard to how it has 
performed and delivered on its functions. The questionnaire is part of a study which forms the thesis 
component of a Masters of Education (Higher Education Studies) at the University of the Western Cape, 
Bellville, South Africa. The questionnaire and study has been checked and approved in an ethical review 
process conducted by the University of the Western Cape, Senate Research Ethics Committee.  
All participants of this study will be kept anonymous by the researcher. However, the respondent should 
note that their words may be quoted in the final report but that names of the respondent or the institution 
will not be used in conjunction with the quotation. 
Your full and frank answers will add considerably to the depth and relevance of this study.  
 
Name of institution_____________________________________________ 
Name of respondent ____________________________________________ 
Position at the institution_________________________________________ 
Please sign to indicate your consent________________________________ 
 
For any information concerning this study, please contact any of the persons below: 
Ms. Keitumetse Lebotse (Researcher) Telephone: +26772758545 and email: lebotsek@gmail.com/ 
mkhethob@yahoo.com 
Dr Gerald Ouma (Supervisor) Telephone: +27 21 9599360 Email: gouma@uwc.ac.za 
Dr Thierry Luescher-Mamashela (Supervisor) Telephone: +27833505959 and email: 
thierryluscher@hotmail.com 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please indicate with a tick [√ ] the response category that best reflects your view. You are 
welcome to add comments and explanations at the end of each set of questions.  
 
1. How familiar are you with the following Tertiary Education documents? 
 
Item  
 
 
Likert Scale Scores 
Very 
Familiar 
Somewhat  
familiar 
Neither 
familiar nor 
unfamiliar 
Unfamiliar Never 
heard of 
Don’t 
know/ 
Refuse to 
answer 
A. Tertiary Education 
Act of 1999 
      
B. Consultation Paper 
- Tertiary Education 
Policy for Botswana  
(2005) 
      
C. Human Resource 
Development 
Strategy ( 2009) 
      
D. Norms and 
Standards - 
Establishment of 
Tertiary institutions, 
Regulations 2005 
      
E. Quality Assurance 
Manual ( 2009) 
      
F.TEC Strategic Plan 
2005-2009 
      
G. TEC Annual 
Reports 2004/05-
2008/09 
      
             
Comments_________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
Item  
  
 
Likert Scale Scores 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t know/ 
Refuse to 
answer 
A.TEC should be allowed to 
design the Tertiary Education 
Policy (TEP). 
      
B. TEC has formulated the 
TEP that fits the country’s 
tertiary education system. 
      
C. The TEP is generally 
accepted and supported by all 
stakeholders. 
      
D. TEC should formulate and 
oversee the implementation of 
policy. 
      
E. Being the policy formulator, 
the TEC should monitor the 
implementation of policy. 
      
F. The TEP has fully taken 
into account the strengths and 
weaknesses in the Botswana 
tertiary education system. 
      
G. The TEP should be 
reviewed after every 5 years to 
assess the conditions under 
which it is implemented.  
      
   
Comments_________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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3.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
Item  
  
 
Likert Scale Scores 
Strongl
y agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t know/ 
Refuse to 
answer 
A. The Tertiary Education Act 
does not give TEC adequate 
powers to execute its mandate. 
      
B. The mission of TEC is in 
line with the objectives of the 
policy. 
      
C. TEC has changed its 
strategy overtime to adapt it to 
challenges in tertiary 
education. 
      
D. Generally TEC has played a 
meaningful role in addressing 
tertiary education 
issues/challenges. 
      
E. TEC and Botswana 
Training Authority (BOTA) 
serve the same purpose and 
therefore they should be 
merged. 
      
 
Comments_________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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4.  Your opinion on the overall performance of TEC regarding its function to coordinate 
higher education in the country. 
 
Item  
  
 
Likert Scale Scores 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t know/ 
Refuse to answer 
A. My institution sits in a body 
that advises government on 
issues related to tertiary 
education. 
      
B. My institution enjoys a 
great deal of autonomy from 
the state. 
      
C. My institution is required to 
produce and disseminate 
mandatory reports/annual 
reports to TEC on the running 
of the institution. 
      
D. TEC encourages my 
Institution to forge 
partnerships with the private 
sector. 
      
E. Generally, my institution is 
satisfied with the TEC’s 
overall coordination of tertiary 
education. 
      
 
Comments_________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
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5.  Your opinion on the performance of TEC regarding quality assurance in higher education 
institutions.  
 
Item  
 
 
Likert Scale Scores 
Strongly 
agree  
Agree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree  Strongly 
disagree  
Don’t know/ 
Refuse to 
answer 
 A. Stakeholders are involved 
in drawing up quality 
assurance standards. 
      
 B. TEC offers assistance to 
institutions to help clarify the 
contents of the quality 
assurance framework and 
implement them. 
      
C. The quality assurance 
framework is adequate to 
guide quality assurance in 
tertiary education. 
      
D. TEC has the capacity to 
implement the quality 
assurance framework. 
      
E. The TEC has enough 
powers to be able to address 
quality issues in tertiary 
education. 
      
F. Tertiary institutions are 
treated equally in terms of 
adhering to the quality 
assurance framework. 
      
G. My institution uses the TEC   
quality assurance manual 
(2009) to improve quality. 
      
H. I am satisfied with the 
performance of TEC in 
ensuring quality in tertiary 
education institutions. 
      
I. I am satisfied with the 
overall performance of TEC 
(with respect to functions other 
than QA). 
      
 
Comment__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Please add additional final comments 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your time! 
 
 
 
 
 
